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INTRODUCTION
God, I, Craig, take you, Pat, to be my husband, to have and to
hold from this day forward, for better, for worse, for richer, for
poorer, in sickness and in health, to love and to cherish, until we
are parted by death. This is my solemn vow.
1
For Craig Dean and Pat Gill,2 like many homosexual couples,3 this
moment is a dream that has never become a reality.4 Presently, no
1. ABRAHAM J. KLAUSNER, WEDDINGS: A COMPLETE GUIDE TO ALL RELIGIOUS AND IN-
TERFAnrHMARIAGE SERvicES 53 (1986).
2. Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995). The plaintiffs in this case were
Craig Robert Dean and Patrick Gerard Gill. For a more detailed discussion of this case see dis-
cussion infra Part I.
3. For purposes of this Note, any use of the word homosexual will include gay men and
lesbians unless otherwise indicated. Use of the terms gay and lesbian is meant to also include
bisexual, transsexual, and transgender persons.
4. See For Better or For Wo NEVSwEE, May 24, 1993, at 69. Despite legal and social
prosciptions against same-sex marriage, many lesbians and gays have participated in symbolic
ceremonies. "During a massive gay [lesbian, bisexual and transgender] rights march in Wash-
ington, [ D.C.,] 1,500 homosexual couples participated in a 'wedding' replete with ministers
and rice." Id See also Nightline: Same-Sev Marriages Pmposed in Hawai4 (ABC television broadcast,
Sept. 25, 1995). Some commentators have argued that participation in symbolic ceremonies in
combination with domestic partnership legislation would "stop short of marriage, but could
grant to same-sex couples many of the same benefits, from filing ofjoint tax returns, to visiting a
partner in the hospital, to inheritance rights." Id. Proponents of same-sex marriages argue,
however, that while domestic partnership legislation is a step in the right direction, it simply
does not go far enough. As Evan Wolfson of the Lambda Legal Defense Fund argues, "domestic
partnership, even if it were to be extended in its fullest capacity, doesn't come close to ap-
proaching all the legal and economic and important social benefits, responsibilities, rights, and
obligations that come with the institution of marriage...." Id. For further insight on the advan-
tages and disadvantages of domestic partnership legislation see generally, Hubertj. Barnhardt, III,
Let The Legislature Define the Family: Wy Default Statutes Should Be Used to Eliminate Potenttal Confu-
sion, 40 EMOfRYLJ. 571, 60-08 (1991) (explaining that legislatures should define family because
it can provide precise definition of who does and does not qualify as family instead of relying on
courts to define family on a case-by-case basis).
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state legally recognizes same-sex marriages. 5 In Baehr v. Lewin, 6 the
Hawaii Supreme Court reignited the controversy over same-sex
marriages7 by requiring the State of Hawaii to demonstrate that
prohibiting same-sex marriage is based upon compelling state
interests.8  The state's ability to demonstrate 'the requisite
compelling state interests presupposes that the Hawaii legislature
and its citizens will not put a stop to same-sex marriages first. In the
wake of the Hawaii Supreme Court's decision, the Governor of
Hawaii signed a bill banning same-sex marriages. 9 Fearing that the
legalization of same-sex unions in Hawaii would force other states to
5. Peter G. Gunthrie, Marriage Between Persons of the Same Sex, 63 A.L.R.d 1199 (1975)
(noting that cases addressing the legality of same-sex marriage claims have taken the position
that "since marriage has always been the union of a man and woman as husband and wife, there
can not be a valid marriage contract of persons of the same-sex."). Denmark is the only country
that has legalized same-sex marriages. Karlyn Barker, D.C. Gay Couple to Press ight for Maniage
Liens" Kellsy Assailed for Alleged Reversal on Isue, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 1992, at D1. One propo-
nent of same-sex marriages calls the exclusion of homosexuals from marriage "offensive ...
[carrying] a strong symbolic and legal message that lesbian and gay Americans are relegated to
second-class status." Philip S. Gutis, Small Steps Toward Acceptance Renew Debate on Gay Marriage,
N.Y. TIMYs, Nov. 5,1989, § 4, at 24. Conversely, others have expressed reservations about push-
ing for the legalization of same-sex marriages and instead encourage lobbying for domestic
partnership legislation. Id. See also Steven K. Homer, Against Marriagr, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L
REV. 505, 506 (1993) (arguing that legalization of same-sex marriages may very well create new
levels of inequality for homosexuals because "the benefits associated with marriage are likely to
come in a piecemeal fashion because ... marriage does not create social approval but merely
stands for it").
6. 852 P.2d 44, mot.forrecwns granted inpart, 875 P.2d 225 (Haw. 1993). See discussion infra
Part I.D.
7. Nightline, supra note 4 (explaining how the potential for legal recognition of same-sex
marriages in Hawaii creates an issue for the entire country because marriages which are valid in
one state are legally recognized in another).
8. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d at 48 (holding that refusal to grant same-sex marriages is sex-
ual discrimination for which a state must show a compelling governmental interest for it to be
upheld).
9. See New Hawaiian Law Bans Gay Maniage, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1994, at Al; see also
Elaine Herscher, Wen Marriage Is a Tough Proposak Women's Suit at Heart ofDebate Over Same Sex
Unions, S.F. CHRON. May 15, 1995, at Al (noting that legislature also created commission to
study "the inequities faced by same-sex couples-a move that could lead to a statewide domestic
partnerlaw").
JOURNAL OF GENDER & THE LAW [Vol. 5:93
honor those marriages, 10 some state legislatures seek to enact
preventive measures.'1 A final decision in Baehr is not anticipated
until 1997.12
Despite the Baehr decision, other states are still unwilling to
legalize same-sex marriages. The District of Columbia Court of
Appeals recently addressed the issue of whether same-sex couples
have the right to marry. In Dean v. District of Columbia,13 the court
elected not to follow Hawaii's lead and instead followed a long line
of decisions by other state courts refusing to acknowledge same-sex
unions.14 In a per curiam opinion,15 the court in Dean held that the
scope of the District's Marriage and Divorce Act 16 does not
encompass same-sex marriages nor does the Human Rights Act
17 of
the District of Columbia change the definition of marriage.' 8 The
10. For an examination of the choice of law implications if Hawaii recognizes same-sex
marriages, see ag., Joseph W. Hovermill, A ConJict of Laws and Morals: The Choice of Law Implica-
tions of Hawaii's Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages. 53 MD. L REV. 450, 493 (1994) (arguing that
the court should not refuse to recognize same-sex marriages performed legally in another state
unless the state legislature has clearly expressed public policy to the contrary); Deborah M.
Henson, Vill Same-Sex Maniages Be Recognized in Sister Statesh Full Faith and Credit and Due Process
Limitations on States' Choice of Law Regarding the Status and Incidents of Homosexual Marriages Follow-
ing Hawaii s Baehr v. Leiin, 32 U. LOuIsVImLEJ. FAM. L. 551, 584 (1994) (explaining that if a
state elected not to honor an out-of-state marriage on public policy grounds, the Full Faith and
Credit and Due Process Clauses may override that decision); Thomas M. Keane, Aloha, Mar-
7ragei': Constitutional and Choce of Law Arguments for Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages, 47 STAN. L.
REV. 499,531 (1995) (predicting that if same-sex marriages are recognized, there may be lack of
uniformity in state marriage laws because courts will avoid applying the Full Faith and Credit
Clause and will instead try to determine which state's conflict laws govern); Habib A. Balian, "Til
Death Do Us Part": Granting Full Faith and Credit to Marital Status, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 397, 406-17
(1995) (arguing the Full Faith and Credit Clause may serve as a useful tool to force recognition
of same-sex marriages in other states).
11. SeeDavidW. Dunlap, Some States Trying to Stop Gay Marriages Before They Start4 N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 15, 1995, at A18. "Utah legislators voted overwhelmingly ... to deny recognition to mar-
riages performed elsewhere that do not conform with Utah law ... includ[ing] same-sex unions.
On ... March 1, (1995,j a bill rendering any same-sex marriage null and void falled by one vote
... [in] the South Dakota Senate ... [On March 3, 1995] a bill was introduced in the Alaska
House ... to make it explicit that 'marriage is a civil contract entered into by one man and one
woman.'" See also Nightline, supra note 4 (noting that other states are launching "preemptive
legal strikes," with mixed results).
12. Same-Sex Marriage Trial Postponed Until 1996, L.A. TIMESJuly 15, 1995, atA16 (reporting
that the court postponed the September trial to give the legislature time to review the recom-
mendations of the commission).
13. 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1993).
14. See discussion infra Part I.A.-D. (discussing previous cases addressing the right to same-
sex marriage).
15. Dean, 653 A.2d at 807. AssociateJudges Ferren, Terry, and Steadman heard the appeal.
Judge Ferren concurred and dissented in part.
16. D.C CODE ANN. §§ 30-101 to -121 (1993). The divorce staute is codified at D.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-902 (1993). See infra Part lILA. (discussing this court's interpretation of marriage un-
der the marriage statute).
17. D.C CODEANN. §§ 1-2501 to -2556 (1992). For further analysis of the court's interpre-
tation of the Human Rights Act see infraPart fll.B.
18. D.C. CODEANN. § 30-101 (1992) (defining legal marriage in the District of Columbia).
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court further held that denial of same-sex marriages does not violate
due process or equal protection rights.19 In a lengthy dissent,
however, Judge Ferren disagreed with the court's granting of
summary judgment on the equal protection issue.20
Part I of this Note discusses the prior history of same-sex marriage
claims. Part II describes the factual and procedural background of
the case, and Part III analyzes the court's opinion. Finally, Part IV
evaluates Dean including the conclusions drawn by the court and
discusses how the failure of courts to legally recognize same-sex
unions is gender discrimination in violation of the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.
I. BACKGROUND OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE CLAIMS
Controversy over same-sex marriages2' is not a new
phenomenon 22 nor have the arguments supporting same-sex unions
changed significantly over time.23 In their struggle to legalize same-
sex unions, same-sex marriage advocates have encountered many
barriers. First, the courts' formulation of the definition of marriage
automatically precludes same-sex couples from entering the
institution of marriage because they limit this privilege to
heterosexual couples only.24 In conjunction with this definitional
requirement of marriage, opponents of same-sex marriages buttress
their arguments by claiming that same-sex unions cannot be
recognized as a marriage because procreation is the central purpose
19. See infraPart lI.C. (discussing the court's ruling on the couple's constitutional claims).
20. See infta Part II.C.2.c.
21. See ThePeople Speak, PHoENIX GAZETTE,July 6,1995, atA2. (reporting that a recent poll
by EPIG-MRA-Mitchell Research found that 33% of the nation's voters believe that same-sex
marriages should be allowed, while 63% disagreed, and 4% were undecided); see also Carl J.
Panek, 58 Percent in U.S. Oppose LegalzingSame-Sex Mauiages, Cm. TRIB., Mar. 26,1996, at C12.
22. See Arthur S. Leonard, Lesbian and Gay Families and the Law: A Progress Report 21
FoRD-AM URB. L. REV. 930 (1994) (noting that decisions by appellate courts in Kentucky, Min-
nesota, and Washington refused to order state legislatures to award marriage licenses to same-
sex couples). See also, Henryj. Reske, Gay Mariage Ban Unconstitutional?: Hawaii Supreme Court
Thinks So, Unless State Can Show Compelling Interest, 79 A.B.A.J. 28 (1993). Other states have re-
cently been targeted for marriage-license suits including Florida and Arizona. New Mexico and
NewJersey may also be challenged because "those states' constitutions and case law show poten-
tial for being challenged." See generally, Brad Bonhall, State of the Union, LA. TIMES, Mar. 6,1994,
at 1. Although no state presently recognizes same-sex unions, five California counties and sev-
eral cities do, including Los Angeles, West Hollyvood, and Laguna Beach. Id.
23. See Leonard, supra note 22, at 930 (noting that for same-sex marriage claims, gay liti-
gants typically challenge the statutory meaning of marriage and they raise many constitutional
claims).
24. See William J. Eskridge, A History of Same-Sex Marriage, 79 VA. L. REV. 1419, 1427-32
(1993) (stating that courts purposely formulate a definition of marriage that excludes same-sex
couples from enjoying heterosexual privileges);see also infranote 42, and accompanying text.
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of marriage, 25 which same-sex couples cannot accomplish together.26
In spite of these obstacles, same-sex couples hoping to overcome
society's bias against legal acknowledgement of same-sex marriages
advance a number of arguments supporting their claims.
The first tactic, an argument focusing on statutory interpretation,
is the least plausible argument for several reasons. The argument
runs as follows: where the marriage statute does not explicitly
prohibit same-sex marriages or does not use terms like "husband and
wife" or "one man and one woman," then the statute, by its own
words, does not prohibit same-sex marriages. This argument often
proves to be an unsuccessful tactic because a court can circumvent it
in several ways. First, when the statute is based on general, gender-
neutral language and the legislative history is silent about same-sex
marriages, a plain reading27 of the statute will lead the court to
conclude that the legislature only contemplated the "traditional"
concept of marriage, that between a husband and wife, and not
unions of two women or two men.28 Second, where the statute is
silent on the definition of marriage, courts do not look at a marriage
statute in isolation. Instead, they often look at a marriage statute in
the context of other statutes. For instance, a court may utilize the
canon of in pari materia29 to examine a marriage statute along with a
similar statute such as the divorce statute. The court will thereby
conclude that since only a husband and wife can divorce, the
25. See inftanotes 43 and 52-61 and accompanying text.
26. Even though same-sex couples cannot biologically have children together, many same-
sex couples pursue other alternatives to raise children. Approximately 3 million gay men and
lesbians in the United States are parents, and 8 to 10 million children are raised in lesbian and
gay households. ABA Annual Meeting Provides Forum for Family Law Eerts, 13 Faro. L. Rep.
(BNA) 1512, 1513 (1987). "About 25 percent of gay men and 33 percent of lesbians are par-
ents." Id. Professor Nancy Polikoff notes there are a variety of ways that lesbian couples may
form a family including "adoption from the U.S. and abroad; artificial insemination through a
sperm bank; intercourse with a friend, artificial insemination with an unknown donor, and arti-
ficial insemination with a gay donor." Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers, 78
GEO. L.J. 459, 466-67 (1990) (quoting PHYLLIS LYON & DEL MARTIN, LESBIAN/WOMAN 141
(1972)). "Lesbians also have adopted children who originally came into their homes for foster
care. Lesbian couples sometimes have two children, whether biological or through adoption,
with one woman the legal parent of each ... Many variations exist among lesbian-mother fhmi-
lies, just as among heterosexual families." Id. at 466-67. Options pursued by gay men may in-
clude "adoption and foster care of children, ... donor insemination or [hetero]sexual inter-
course [which enables] gay men ... (to] become biological fathers of children whom they
intend to co-parent with a single woman (whether lesbian or heterosexual), with a lesbian cou-
ple, or with a gay male partner." CharlotteJ. Patterson, Children of Lesbian and Gay Paren, 63
CHIUD DEV. 1025, 1027 (1992).
27. Dean, 653 A.2d at 315.
28. Leonard, supra note 22, at 931 (explaining that courts will not accept a statutory argu-
ment because they "give words their 'ordinary' or 'everyday' meanings).
29. Dean, 653 A.2d at 314 (quoting District of Columbia v. Thompson, 593 A.2d 621, 680
(D.C. 1991)).
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marriage statute could not possibly permit same-sex marriages.30
If the statutory interpretation argument fails, homosexual
litigants usually advance constitutional arguments31 grounded in
either the due process clause or equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.32 Although neither the statutory nor the
Constitutional arguments have proven successful thus far, same-sex
litigants may have more success with Constitutional arguments in the
near future.33 By advancing Constitutional as opposed to statutory
arguments, litigants do not have to contend with the definitional
requirements of marriage. Under the definitional requirement,
same-sex marriages do not fit the legislative definition of "marriage"
because the core purpose of marriage is procreation.3 4
20. Id. at214. Scediscussion infraPartllA and note 111.
31. See Eskridge, supra note 24, at 1424-26 (arguing that any state's refusal to recognize
same-sex marriage violates a due process right to marry, the state's equal rights amendment
and/or the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause, and such discrimination should
trigger heightened equal protection scrutiny). See generally William M. Hohengarten, Same-Sex
Marriage and the Right of Privacy, 103 YALE L.J. 1496 (1994) (arguing that constitutional right of
privacy requires recognition of same-sex marriages); Editors of the Harvard Law Review, Devel-
opments in the Law: Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1508, 1605-11 (1989)
[hereinafter Sexual Orientation and the Law] (stating that prohibition of same-sex marriages vio-
lates fundamental privacy rights and that burdening this right cannot withstand even the lowest
level of scrutiny); Comment, Homosexuals'.Right to Many: A Constitutional Test and a Legilative
Solution, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 193 (1979) (stating that "homosexual couples involved in exclusive,
long-term relationships are similarly situated to committed heterosexual couples" and thus, a
middle level ofjudicial scrutiny should be applied to classification based on sexual preference);
Jennifer L. Heeb, Homosexual Marriage, the Changing American Family, and the Heterosexual Right to
.Ptivacy, 24 SErON HAL L. REV. 347, 380-84 (1993) (arguing the best approach to attaining
same-sex marriage rights is through the due process clause and not the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment "because the marriage and family rights embodied in the Due
Process Clause are equally applicable to homosexuals' interest in marriage"); Alissa Friedman,
The Necessity for State Recognition of Same-Sex Mariage: Constitutional Requirements and Evolving No-
tions ofFamity, 3 BERRELx WONEN's L.J. 134, 169-70 (1987-1988) (asserting that statutes denying
two members of the same-sex a legal right to marry interferes with "fundamental rights to mar-
riage, family, and procreation," and should therefore be subject to strict scrutiny). But sm Note,
The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientatiowr Homosexuality as a Suspect Classificatior, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 1285,1292-97 (1985) (warning that FirstAmendment protection may not be the best vehi-
cle to gain legal recognition of same-sex marriages because First Amendment protection ex-
tends to "public homosexual expression and activities" and not to private homosexual conduct).
32. Leonard, supra note 22, at 932-37 (expounding the fundamental right and suspect clas-
sification arguments for same-sex marriages).
33. See infraPart I.D. and Part 1L.C.2.c.
34. See infra note 51. See also Eskridge, supra note 24 at 1427-28. The "main argument
against same-sex marriages is definitional: marriage is necessarily different-sex and cannot in-
dude same-sex couples. Therefore, the authors of any statute that talks of 'marriage' could have
only contemplated different-sex couples, even if the statute is not gendered, i.e., does not use
the specific terms 'husband and wife.'" Id. Another part of this argument is that "same-sex un-
ions are not 'marriages' because the purpose of marriage is procreation, which same-sex couples
cannot accomplish." rd.
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A. Same-Sex Marriage Claims and Marriage Statutes
Baker v. Nelson35 typifies the difficulty in overcoming the
definitional argument against same-sex marriages. The court in
Baker was the first court during the flurry of same-sex marriage cases
during the 1970s to consider a same-sex marriage claim based upon
the denial of a marriage license.36 The litigants, a gay couple,
alleged that since the marriage statute did not explicitly prohibit
same-sex marriages, the legislature intended to authorize same-sex
unions.3 7 The Minnesota court essentially ruled that marriage is
strictly a heterosexual privilege. 38 After examining a dictionary
definition of marriage,3 9 the court stated that the governing
marriage statute defines "marriage" as "the state of the union
between persons of the opposite sex. It is unrealistic to think that
the original draftsmen of our marriage statutes, which date from
territorial days, would have used the term in any different sense."
40
In Jones v. Hallahan, two Kentucky litigants suffered the same fate
when they applied for a marriage license.41 Although the Kentucky
statute at issue did not specifically prohibit same-sex marriages, the
litigants were once again unable to overcome the definitional
meaning of marriage. The court stated that the litigants were
"prevented from marrying, not by the statutes of Kentucky or the
refusal of the County Court Clerk ofJefferson County to issue them a
license, but rather by their own incapability of entering into a
35. 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972). The same-sex mar-
riage cases of the 1970s reflect the modem gay and lesbian rights movement sparked by the
1969 Stonewall Riots. "Before the birth of Gay Liberation at the Stonewall Inn, ... lesbian and
gay activists, and the homophile movement had been scarcely visible to the general population.
The notion that anybody could have a 'right' to a same-sex marriage was virtually non-existent."
Friedman, sup-a note 31, at 137 (footnote omitted).
36. Baker 191 N.W.2d at 185. See, eg., infranotes 39-40.
37. Bake, 191 N.W.2d at 185.
38. ME at 186.
39. Id. The court examined sources such as WEBSIER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
and BLACK'S LAW DICTIoNARY to ascertain the definition of marriage. WEBSTIE'S THIRD NEV
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY defines marriage as the "state of being united to a person of the
opposite sex as husband or wife." Id. at n.1 (citation omitted). BLACK'S LAWDICTIONARY defines
marriage as "the civil status, condition, or relation of one man and one woman united in law fot'
life, for the discharge to each other and the community of the duties legally incumbent on
those whose association is founded on the distinction of sex." Id. (citation omitted).
40. Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 186.
41. 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973) (the avo female plaintiffs asserted that they were entitled to
a marriage license).
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marriage as that term is defined."42 The court stated that this
definitional argument against same-sex marriages is completely
"tautological and circular."43 The court defined marriage as the
union between men and women, thus excluding same-sex couples
because marriage is only the union between a man and a woman.44
The courts' formulations of the definition of marriage therefore
make no attempt to define or understand marriage beyond
exclusion of same-sex couples.
Another context in which same-sex marriage litigation may arise is
in the dissolution of a same-sex union. Of course, this situation has
only arisen in cases involving people who are transsexual or
transgendered. For instance, in Anonymous v. Anonymous, 45 the
plaintiff, sought dissolution of his marital status. The plaintiff
married his wife, supposedly believing her to be a woman by birth,
but he subsequently "discovered" that she had male sex organs. 4
6
According to the court, the couple never acted like husband and
wife because they never engaged in sexual intercourse and did not
42. Id. at 589. The court further observed that "the relationship proposed by the appel-
lants does not authorize the issuance of a marriage license because what they propose is not a
marriage." & at 590. Additional cases holding that same-sex individuals do not have a right to
marry include: Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119, 1123 (C.D. Cal. 1980), aff'd on other
grounds, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied 458 U.S. 1111 (1982) (stating that even if
Colorado law recognized same-sex unions, it would be against the policy of the federal govern-
ment to recognize such relationships under the federal Immigration and Nationality Act); In re
Estate of Cooper, 187 A.D.2d 128, 132 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (holding that term "surviving
spouse" does not include homosexual life partners and therefore, survivor is not entitled to
election under decedent's will); Gavoski v. Gavoski, 610 N.E.2d 431, 433 (Ohio Ct App. 1991)
(holding that woman cannot live in concubinage with another woman, as homosexuals living
together in Ohio can never marry, and, thus, can never be concubines to one another"); De
Santo v. Barnsely, 476 A.2d 952 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1984) (holding two persons of same-sex can not
enter into common law marriage); Slayton v. State, 633 S.W.2d 934 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982)
(noting that it is impossible for persons of the same sex to marry "with orwithout the formalities
of law"); Jennings v. Jennings, 315 A.2d 816, 820 n.7 (Md. Spec. CL App. 1974) (noting that
Maryland does not recognize same-sex unions. "Only a marriage between a man and a woman is
valid in this state.").
43. See Richard D. Mohr, 77w Casefor Gay Marriage, 9 NOTRE DAMEJ.L. ETMICS & PUB. POL'Y
215, 221 (1995) (noting that since courts construe marriage to mean only a union between a
man and woman that "gender discrimination and sexual-orientation discrimination is built into
the institution of marriage; therefore since marriage itself is permitted, so too must barring
same-sex couples from it Discrimination against gays ... is not illegitimate discrimination in
marriage, indeed it is necessary to the very institution ..."); Eskridge, supra note 24, at 1427-28
(discussing that a focus on the definition of marriage is disposed of in one of two ways:
"functional approach" or "definitional approach"). The "functional approach" entails defining
marriage by its supposed purpose, procreation. The "definitional approach" involves defining
marriage as only for different-sex couples therefore excluding same-sex unions. See also .Baehr,
852 P.2d at 61 (characterizing the definitional approach to defining same-sex marriages as
"circular and unpersuasive").
44. Jones, 501 S.W.2dat588-89.
45. 325 N.Y.S.2d 499 (N.Y. Sup. Ct 1971).
46. IT
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cohabitate as a husband and wife.47 Even though the wife later
removed her male sex organs,48 the court held that the parties could
never have been "husband and wife."49 In observing that the law
does not include marriages of the same-sex, there was no reason for
the plaintiff to seek an annulment because "the marriage ceremony
itself was a nullity. No legal relationship could be created by it."50
B. Same-Sex Marriage Cases and Constitutional Claims
Constitutional arguments were equally unpersuasive in courts of
the 1970s. In Baker,51 the Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that
the prohibition of same-sex marriages neither denied a fundamental




50. Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 501. For other leading cases addressing the dissolution of a
same-sex union, see B. v. B., 355 N.Y.S.2d 712, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974) (holding that a female to
male transsexual has no valid counterclaim for divorce in annulment proceeding because there
can not be marriage contract between a woman and partner lacking male sex organs) (emphasis
added). ButseeM.T. v.J.T., 355 A.2d 204 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976), cert. denied, 364 A.2d
1076 (holding that even though the state marriage statute requires partners to be of the oppo-
site sex, a male who has a successfil gender reassignment can be considered female for marital
purposes).
51. 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
52. Id. at 186. Adhering to the traditional meaning of marriage, the court stated that
"[t]he institution of marriage as a union of man and woman, uniquely involving the procreation
and rearing of children within a family, is as old as the Book of Genesis." Id. By determining
that procreation is the central purpose of marriage, the court concluded that the institution of
marriage does not include same-sex couples because they can not create children together. Id.
Same-sex couples can have children through alternative means of reproduction, such as
through a sperm donor or surrogate mother. See Sexual Orientation and the Law, supra note 31 at
1608. A logical extension of the argument that procreation is the central purpose of marriage
would preclude heterosexual couples incapable of having children from marrying. See Patterson,
supra note 27 at 1027 (discussing alternative families).
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discriminatory.53 The court in Jones v. Hallahan folowed the Baker
decision and found no Constitutional rights violated for individuals
of the same-sex who are denied the right to marry.
55
The Washington Supreme Court, in Singer v. Hara,5 6 was the only
court during the 1970s to address litigants' Constitutional arguments
extensively. Upon examining the statutory requirements to obtain a
marriage license, the court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the
statutes do not prohibit same-sex marriages.57  The plaintiffs'
constitutional arguments also failed to persuade the judges.58 The
court rebuffed the claim that limiting access to same-sex marriages
53. Baker, 191 N.W2d at 187. The court responded to petitioner's procreation argument by
stating that:[t]here is no irrational or invidious discrimination. Petitioners note that the state
does not impose upon heterosexual married couples a condition that they have a proved capac-
ity or declared willingness to procreate, posing a rhetorical demand that this court must read
such condition into the statute if same-sex marriages are to be prohibited. Even assuming that
such a condition would be neither unrealistic nor offensive under the Griswold rationale, the
classification is no more than theoretically imperfect. We are reminded ... that 'abstract symme-
try' is not demanded by the Fourteenth Amendment Id. The court elaborated in a footnote on
its rejection of the equal protection claim by noting that "[t]he Constitution does not require
things which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same."
Id. at 187 n.4 (quoting Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940)). The court further found the
litigants' Lovinganalogy inapplicable because "there is a clear distinction between a marital re-
striction based ... upon race and ... fundamental difference[s] in sex." Baker, 191 N.W.2d at
187. In Loving v. Virginia, 288 U.S. 1 (1967), the Court struck down Virginia's anti-
miscegenation statute noting that "[t]here can be no doubt that restricting the freedom to
marry solely because of racial classifications violates the central meaning of the Equal Protection
Clause." Id. at 12. For an in-depth analysis comparing anti-miscegenation statutes and same-sex
marriage prohibitions, see James Trosino, American Wedding Same-Sex Marriage and the Miscegena-
tion Analogy, 73 B.U. L REV. 93 (1993). Trosino argues that anti-miscegenation laws were not
actually racial restrictions. Rather, legislators based these laws on the notion that: there was a
fundamental difference between the races, and that this difference made interracial marriage inap-
propriate ... what the Baker court is really saying, without any empirical support, is that there is
some fundamental difference between a gay relationship and a heterosexual relationship, and
that this difference justifies denying gay couples the right to many. Id. at 112-13. Unlike the
Baker court, the court in Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P-2d 44 (Haw.), reh'g granted in part, 875 P.2d 225
(Haw. 1993) is the only court thus far to adopt the Lovinganalogy to recognize a same-sex mar-
riage claim. As the Baehr court stated, "[slubstitution of 'sex' for 'race' and article I, section 5
for the fourteenth amendment yields the precise case before us together with the conclusion
that we have reached." Id. at 68.
54. 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973).
55. Id. at 590 (statink that "no constitutional issue is involved. We find no constitutional
sanction or protection of the right of marriage between persons of the same sex.").
56. 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App.), rehkdenied, 84Wash. 2d 1008 (1974).
57. Id. at 1189 (stating that the statute's reference to males and females "dearly dispels any
suggestion that the legislature intended to authorize same-sex marriages").
58. Singer, 522 P.2d at 1190-97. The plaintiffs argued that since the Equal Rights Amend-
ment of the Washington Constitution prohibits classification on account of sex, it is unconstitu-
tional to construe state law as permitting a man to many a woman but denying him the right to
marry a man. Id at 1190. The plaintiffs also presented an equal protection challenge based on
the federal Constitution, arguing that a statutory prohibition of same-sex marriage is a classifica-
tion based on sex and is therefore inherently suspect. Plaintiffs urged the court to require a
"compelling state interest' rather than a mere rational interest in order to uphold the statute.
Id. at 1195.
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violates the state Equal Rights Amendment (ERA).59 The court
implicitly accepted the state's argument that this prohibition applied
equally to all same-sex couples.60 Therefore, since the plaintiffs, a
gay couple, failed to show that the state treated them differently
from a lesbian couple, the prohibition of same-sex marriages is not
an impermissible sexual classification under the ERA.61
Similarly, the court disposed of the plaintiffs' equal protection
arguments under the U.S. Constitution by applying a rational basis
test. 62 Instead of adopting a strict scrutiny test,63 the court declared
that since the state has a vested interest in fostering a favorable
environment to raise children, the state has a rational basis for
excluding gay and lesbian couples from the right to many.64
C. The Impact of Bowers v. Hardwick
It is important to note that the flurry of unsuccessful same-sex
marriage claims during the 1970s predate the Supreme Court's
59. Id. at 1194-95. In drawing this conclusion, the Singer court limited the scope of the ERA
by making assumptions about what voters intended by passing the ERA. The court stated that:
We are not persuaded that voter approval of the ERA necessarily included an in-
tention to permit same-sex marriages. On the contrary ... the Voters Pamphlet in-
dicated that the basic principle of the ERA is that both sexes be treated equally
under the law ... to be entitled to relief under the ERA, appellants must make a
showing that they are somehow being treated differendy by the government than
they-would be if they were females.
Id. at 1190 n.5 (citations omitted).
60. Id. at 1190 n.5.
61. Singer, 522 P.2d at 1194-95. The court failed to see the similarity between the prohibi-
tion of same-sex marriages in this context and the impermissible racial classification struck down
in Loving; 388 U.S. 1 (1967). The court stated that:
[iun Loving... the parties were barred from entering into the marriage relation-
ship because of an impermissible racial classification. There is no analogous sex-
ual classification involved ... because appellants are not being denied entry into
the marriage relationship because of their sex; rather, they are being denied entry
into the marriage relationship because of the recognized definition of that rela-
tionship as one which may be entered into only by two persons of the opposite
sex.
Id. at 1192.
62. Singer, 522 P.2d at 1196-97.
63. Id. While the court acknowledged that classifications based on sex are subject to strict
judicial scrutiny under Washington law, it avoided applying the the strict standard of review by
concluding that the prohibition of same-sex marriage is not a classification based on sex. Appli-
cation of strict scrutiny requires the state to show that a compelling governmental interest ne-
cessitates the prohibition of same-sex marriages. Application of the rational basis test, however,
requires only that the prohibition of same-sex marriage be rationally related to a legitimate gov-
ernmental objective. Id. at 1195-97.
64. See id. at 1197 (reasoning that "marriage as now defined is deeply rooted in our society
. marriage is so clearly related to the public interest in affording a favorable environment for
the growth of children thatwe are unable to say that there is not a rational basis upon which the
state may limit the protection of its marriage laws to the legal union of one man and one
woman.").
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controversial decision in Bowers v. Hardwik.65 Although the Bowers
Court found that the right to engage in adult consensual
homosexual sodomy is not protected by the right of privacy, the
Bowers decision raises a number of other Constitutional questions, 66
including whether this decision forecloses the possibility of same-sex
marriage rights.67
The Bowers decision should not, however, serve as the basis for
rejecting a same-sex marriage claim. First, the Supreme Court
decided Bowers under "the Due Process Clause, not the Equal
Protection Clause, and did not involve discrimination at all."68
Consequently, the Bowers decision should not serve as a barrier to
lesbian and gay litigants asserting same-sex marriage claims under an
equal protection or discrimination theory. Second, even under a
due process analysis, the Bowers decision should not preclude the
application of the privacy doctrine for same-sex marriage claims.69
Same sex couples can join the institution of marriage even if the
state proscribes the practice of sodomy.70 One's participation in an
activity that the state proscribes does not qualify as an automatic
relinquishment of other rights. Therefore, "the right of gay men
and lesbians to marry is unrelated to their right to engage in
65. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (rejecting the existence of a federal constitutional right of privacy
between two adult males engaging in consensual sodomy).
66. S& Mary C. Dunlap, Gay Men and Lesbians Down by Law in the 1990's USA: The Continuing
Toll ofBowers v. Hardwick, 24 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1994) (noting that some constitu-
tional claims raised in the aftermath of Bowers include "whether all oral-genital and all anal-
genital sexual activities between consenting adult heterosexuals in physical privacy can be
criminalized ... [o]r if constitutional privacy is to be afforded only for heterosexual private con-
senting adult sexual activities").
67. The conflict between allowing same-sex marriage in a state that criminalizes homosex-
ual sodomy between consenting adults is that partners to a legally recognized union cannot le-
gally consummate their union. See Mary F. Gardner, Braschi v. Stahl Associates Co.: Much Ado
About Nothing, 35 VILL. L. REV. 261, 63 (1990) (noting that since states do not violate the con-
stitution by criminalizing consensual sodomy, recognition of same-sex marriages may conflict
with some state laws that make adult consensual sodomy a crime).
68. Cass L Sunstein, Honwserualty and the Constitution, 70 IND. LJ. 1 (1994). The Bowers
Court refused to find that homosexuals have a fundamental right to engage in consensual ho-
mosexual sodomy because "[plroscriptions against that conduct have ancient roots." Bowers 478
U.S. 186, 192 (1986). As a consequence, "to claim that a right to engage in such conduct is
'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered lib-
erty' is, at best, facetious.'" IM. at 194. The Court also reasoned that because the same-sex liti-
gants did not demonstrate that the right to practice sodomy bore some relation to "family, mar-
riage or procreation," the consitutional right to privacy does not protect homosexual conduct.
Id at 191.
69. See Mark Strasser, DomesticRelationsJurispudnence and the Great, SlumbeingBaehr: On Defi-
nitional Preclusion, Equal Protection, and Fundamental Interest, 64 FoRDai L. REv. 921, 974-75
(1995) (arguing the view that Bowers precludes same-sex marriages ignores the limited focus,
i.e., due process rights, of that Court's decision).
70. Sexual Orientation and theLao, supra note 31, at 1606 n.23.
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sodomy."71 Under this analysis, same-sex litigants within the District
of Columbia can not only raise equal protection and discrimination
arguments, but litigants can also raise same-sex marriage claims
under the right of privacy, bolstered by the fact that the District of
Columbia no longer proscribes homosexual sodomy between
consenting adults.72
D. The Implications of Baehr v. Lewin
The decision in Baehr73 signifies an unprecedented breakthrough
for same-sex couples seeking a right to marry. To date, the Hawaii
Supreme Court is the only court in the history of the United States
that has potentially recognized a right for same-sex couples to marry
legally. On remand, the Hawaii Supreme Court ordered the State of
Hawaii to overcome the difficult burden of proving that the
prohibition of same-sex marriages is based upon compelling state
interests. 74
As in the 1970s cases,75 the three same-sex litigants in Baehr were
unable to overcome some of the same barriers that their
predecessors encountered. First, the Hawaii Supreme Court
determined that by the plain language of the marriage statute, the
Hawaii Legislature intended to restrict marital relations to "male and
female" couples.76 Additionally, the Hawaii Supreme Court ruled
that the prohibition of same-sex marriages does not violate the
fundamental Constitutional right of privacy. 77 Guided by caselaw
addressing the fundamental right to marry protected by the federal
71. Sexual Orentation and the Law, supra note 31, at 1606 n.23. Itis important to note that if
the Bowerdecision included the crimininalization of consensual adult heterosexual sodomy, it is
highly improbable that the courts would forbid heterosexuals from entering the institution of
marriage because the state proscribes such conduct. Likewise, it is unreasonable to exclude
same-sex couples from the institution of marriage because they may engage in the very same or
similar sexual conduct as heterosexuals.
72. D.C. CODEANN. § 22-3502, repealed by D.C. law 10-257, § 501(b) (1995).
73. 852 P.2d 44, rehggrantedinpar, 875 P.2d 225 (Haw. 1993).
74. Id. at 68.
75. See supra Part IA-B. Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 185 (holding that the prohibition of same-
sex marriages is not individiously discriminatory and does not deny a fundamental right); Jones,
501 S.W.2d at 588 (stating that same-sex marriages have no constitutional sanction or protec-
tion); Singer, 522 P.2d at 1187 (finding that prohibition of same-sex marriages does not violate
the state Equal Rights Amendment nor the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment); Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 499 (holding that no legal marriage existed where the fe-
male partner had male genitalia).
76. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 60. See HAW. REV. STAT. sec. 572-1(7) (1985) (requiring that "the
man and the woman to be married and the person performing the marriage ceremony all be
physically present at the same place and time at the marriage ceremony) (emphasis added).
77. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 57 (holding that same-sex couples do not have fundamental right to
same-sex marriage "arising out of the right of privacy or otherwise").
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Constitution, the court determined that the right to many protected
by the Hawaii Constitution is similar to the implicit federal right.78
The court determined that the federal "fundamental right to marry
... presently contemplates unions between men and women."79 The
court was thus umvilling to extend Hawaii's fundamental right to
marry to same-sex couples.
80
The court was, however, more compelled to accept the equal
protection claim. In comparing the equal protection clause of the
Hawaii Constitution to that of the United States Constitution, the
court concluded that the Hawaii Constitution allows the court to
accord greater equal protection rights than the United States
Constitution because it specifically prohibits discrimination based
upon impermissible sexual classifications.81 Unlike previous courts
addressing same-sex marriage claims,82 the Hawaii Supreme Court
held for the first time that "sex is a 'suspect category' ... [and] is
subject to 'strict scrutiny.'" 83 Despite the giant step the Hawaii
Supreme Court took to ensure same-sex marriage rights in Hawaii,
other states continue to dispose of same-sex marriage claims based
upon the Equal Protection Clause of the federal Constitution or
another state constitution.8 4 The decision in Dean v. District of
78. Id. at 55-57. The court looked to federal case law for guidance because the right to
marry protected by the Hawaii Constitution was not delineated by any Hawaii court. Id. at 55.
79. Id. at 56.
80. Id. at 57 (holding that the plaintiffs' due process rights were not violated because the
right to same-sex marriage is not "so rooted in the traditions and collective conscience of our
people that failure to recognize itwould violate the fundamental principles of liberty and justice
that lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions").
81. Id. at 59-60. The court stated that:
The equal protection clauses of the United States and Hawaii Constitutions are
not mirror images of one another. The fourteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution ... provides ... that a state may not "deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." ... [Tihe Hawaii Constitution
provides ... that "(n]o person shall ... be denied the equal protection of the laws,
nor be denied the enjoyment of theperson's dvil rights or be discyiminated against in the exer-
cise thereof because ofrace, religion, sex, or ancestry."
I'd. (citations omitted).
82. See supra Part A-B and cases cited.
83. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 67.
84. For further analysis on Baehrand the implications of permitting same-sex marriages in
Havraii, see Jeffrey J. Swart, The Wedding Luau-Who is Invited?: Hawaii, Same-Sex Marriage, and
Emerging Realities, 43 EMORY L.J. 1577, 1614-15 (1994) (arguing the decision in Baehr reflects a
recognition of changing circumstances rather thanjudicial legislation); Megan E. Farrell, Baehr
v. Lewin: auetionableReasoning; SoundJudgment, 1J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y589, 591-92
(stating that the decision in Baehrisjustified even if the court did not follow its own past reason-
ing for determining the level of scrutiny to be applied to sex-based cassifications); see also, Scott
IL Kozuma, Baehr v. Lewin and Same-S x Manige: The Continued Stnuggle for Socia, Political and
Human Legitimaty, 30 WiulAMETrE L. REV. 891 (1994). The Baehr decision may not advance gay
and lesbian rights because:
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Columbia,85 demonstrates the continued reluctance to open the
institution and privileges of marriage to same-sex couples.
8 6
II. BACKGROUND OF DEAN V. DSTRICT OF COLUMBIA
On November 13, 1990, the appellants,87 Craig Dean and Robert
Gill, applied for a marriage license from the Clerk of the Superior
Court as required by District of Columbia law.88 The couple
subsequently received a letter from the Clerk rejecting their
application for a marriage license.8 9 Dean and Gill thereafter filed a
complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief in the District of
Columbia Superior Court seeking an order requiring the Clerk to
issue a marriage license.90 They argued that: (1) they qualify for a
marriage license under the marriage statute because it is "gender-
neutral" and (2) the Clerk interpreted and applied the marriage
statute provisions in violation of the District of Columbia Human
Rights Act9I because the refusal to issue a license is impermissible
discrimination based upon sex or sexual orientation.92
The District filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Judge Bowers
it is unclear whether the Hawaii court's decision will significantly advance the gay-
rights movement ... [tihe Baehr opinion expressly distinguishes between same-sex
and homosexual couples, noting that the two are not necessarily synonymous.
This, in effect, negates any direct implication that the decision seeks to place sex-
ual preference within the purview of the equal protection guarantee. In fact, the
court's holding is based solely on the grounds of sex, not sexual orientation, dis-
crimination. In terms of technical legal analysis, then, Baehr does little to aid ef-
forts to legitimize homosexuality.
Id. at 904-905.
85. 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995) (per curiam).
86. A favorable decision in Dean was pivotal to some proponents of same-sex marriages be-
cause the District of Columbia does not impose a residency requirement in order to marry.
Therefore, a same-sex couple could marry in the District of Columbia and hope that their home
state would honor that marriage. Leonard, supra note 22, at 940.
87. The appellants, a same-sex couple, applied for a marriage license and the District of
Columbia denied their request. Dean, 653 A.2d at 309.
88. D.C. CODE ANN. § 30-110 (1993) (authorizing the Clerk of the Court to grant applica-
tions for marriage licenses). See infra Part IIIA. (discussing the Dean court's interpretation of
the District of Columbia marriage statute).
89. The letter denying the marriage application stated: "[t]he sections of the District of
Columbia Code governing marriages do not authorize marriage between persons of the same
sex. Therefore, the application for a marriage license in this case is denied." Dean, 653 A.2d at
309.
90. Id.
91. Human Rights Act, D.C. CoDEANN. § 1-2501 to 2557 (1992).
92. Dean, 653 A.2d at 309. See also, Human Rights Act, D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2501 (1992)
(stating that the intent behind this enactmentwas to eliminate, among other things, discrimina-
tion based upon sex and sexual orientation). For a further discussion of tie Human Rights Act
see infra Part lrl.
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thereafter granted summary judgment for the District because what
the couple sought to enter was not, by statutory definition, a
marriage.93  Dean and Gill moved for reconsideration. 94  They
asserted that the trial court's interpretation of the marriage statute
and the Human Rights Act violated their Constitutional rights to due
process and equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth
Amendment and violated the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment.9 5  Judge Bowers granted the motion for
reconsideration, but rejected all of Dean and Gill's Constitutional
claims.96 The couple presented both statutory and Constitutional
claims on appeal.
97
After an exhaustive analysis, the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals, in a per curiam opinion, 98 affirmed the trial court's
granting of summary judgment. Specifically, the court found that:
(1) the prohibition of same-sex marriages in the District of Columbia
neither violated homosexuals' due process99 or equal protection
rights;100 (2) the Human Rights Act did not change the definition of
93. Dean, 653 A.2d 309-10. In granting the motion for summaryjudgment Judge Bowers
stated:
Plaintiffs were denied a marriage license because of the nature of marriage itself,
requiring ... the parties ... be a male and a female. What the plaintiffs ... sought
a license to enter into, by definition, simply was not a 'marriage.' Any change in
that definition must come from the legislature-not this Court.
Id. at 310. In order to ascertain the meaning of marriage, Judge Bowers examined: (1) the legis-
lative history of the Marriage and Divorce Act, D.C. Law 1-107, 1977 D.C. Stat. 114; (2) the ref-
erences to gender in the various provisions of the District of Columbia Code; (3) references to
marriage in the Bible; (3) decisions by appellate courts in otherjurisdictions; (4) the dictionary
definition of marriage; (5) the common law of the District of Columbia; and (6) the rejection by
the City Council to include same-sex marriages in the Human Rights Act. Id. at 309-10.
94. Indicative of the court's bias, the trial judge accused appellants of "an eleventh hour
attempt to recast themselves as victims of unconstitutional action." Id. at 321.
95. Id. at 310. On appeal, the appellants dropped their claim that the trial court's and the
Council's reliance on the Bible to understand the meaning of marriage violated their First
Amendment rights. Id. at 310 n.1.
96. Dean, 653 A.2d at 310. The trial court concluded that homosexuals qualify neither as a
"suspect" class nor as a "quasi-suspect class." The court thereafter held that the prohibition of
same-sex couples from marriage is rationally related to three state interests: (1) fostering pro-
creation, which is essential to the survival of the human race; (2) prohibiting sodomy, an activity
deemed by society to be "so morally reprehensible" that it is criminalized in the District of Co-
lumbia as well as other jurisdictions; and (3) avoiding unwarranted "'social tinkering' with one
of the most sacred institutions known to mankind, namely, marriage .." Id. at 332-33. Interest-
ingly, after the trial court issued its opinion, the District's statute criminalizing sodomy was
amended "to eliminate consensual sexual acts between persons who are above the existing age
of consent." Id. at 334 n.30.
97. Dean, 653 A.2d at 310.
98. Id. at808.
99. Id at333.
100. Id. at 361-64.
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marriage;10 and (3) the marriage statute did not include same-sex
marriages.10 2 Judge Ferren dissented, however, believing that there
were material issues of fact that preclude granting summary
judgment on the equal protection issue.
10 3
Ill. TE COURT'S ANALYSIS
A. The D. C. Marriage Statute Excludes Same-Sex Marniages
In ruling on the statutory interpretation arguments, the court
extensively examined the meaning of marriage through the
legislative history of the marriage statute, statutes enacted along with
the marriage statute, and legislation amending the marriage statute.
The heart of Dean and Gill's statutory challenge 0 4 centered on the
gender-neutral language of the marriage statute. The Dean court
noted that since its enactment in 1901,105 the marriage statute has
not undergone significant changes that would affect the couple's
claims.1 06 The court's task, then, was to ascertain what Congress
meant by marriage in 1901.107 Dean and Gill encouraged the court
to examine the plain language of the statute because its gender-
neutral language presumably indicated that the marriage statute "has
always authorized same-sex marriages." 0 8 The court disagreed with
their analysis because one provision of the marriage statute retains
101. Id.at320.
102. Dear, 653 A.2d at 314.
103. Id. at 358 (Ferren, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Ferren would
remand the case for trial on the equal protection issue. See infra Part MH.C.2.c for further analysis
of'Judge Ferren's dissent.
104. Their appeal first focused on the Marriage and Divorce Act, D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 30-101
to 30-121 (1993).
105. Dean, 653 A.2d at 310 n.2.
106. Id. at 312. The only significant changes to the Marriage and Divorce Act occurred in
1977. Id. at 311. Apparently, a proposed bill by Councilmember Arrington Dixon, which did not
become a law, would have implicitly authorized same-sex marriages. "Bill No. 1-89 would have
changed § 30-101 to read: '[a] marriage between two persons which is licensed, solemnized and
registered as provided in this Act is valid in the District of Columbia." Id. In another section,
the legislature made a specific reference to same-sex marriages:
The court shall enter its decree declaring the invalidity of a marriage entered into
under the following circumstances ... a party lacks the physical capacity to con-
summate the marriage by sexual intercourse, and at the time the marriage was
solemnized the other party did not know of the incapacity; provided that this clause
shall not apply persons of the same se=
Id. at 311-12 (quoting proposed change to D.C. CODE ANN. § 30-112 (1975) (emphasis in origi-
nal)). The court concluded that if the bill had been adopted, same-sex marriages would have
been permissible in the District of Columbia. Id. at 312. Consequently, the actual changes to
the 1977 Act are irrelevant to the case at hand. Id.
107. Dean, 653 A.2d at 312 (footnote omitted).
108. Id.
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gender-specific language; 10 9 thus, the consanguinity provision"1°
reflects "taboos-indeed moral judgments about improper marriage
relationships-that transcend genetic concerns. The use of gender-
based terminology ... reflects a legislative understanding that
marriage, as understood by Congress ... is inherently a male-female
relationship."
111
In support of this conclusion, the court also studied statutes
relating to and affecting marriage rights. As the court reasoned, if
same-sex couples can marry, then logically they can divorce. 112 The
court discovered, however, that the legislature filled the divorce
109. Id. at 313. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 30-101 (1993). As the couple argued, the statute does
not explicitly state that parties of the same-sex can not marry nor that a valid marriage requires
a man and woman. The code provides that the following marriages shall be void:
(1) The marriage of a man with his grandmother, grandfather's wife, wife's
grandmother, father's sister, mother's sister, mother, stepmother, wife's mother,
daughter, wife's daughter, son's wife, sister, son's daughter, daughter's daughter,
son's son's wife, daughter's son's wife, wife's son's daughter, wife's daughter's
daughter, brother's daughter, sister's daughter;,
(2) The marriage of a woman with her grandfather, grandmother's husband, hus-
band's grandfather, father's brother, mother's brother, father, stepfather, hus-
band's father, son, husband's son, daughter's husband, brother, son's son, daugh-
ter's son, son's daughter's husband, daughter's daughter's husband, husband's
son's son, husband's daughter's son, brother's son, sister's son;
(3) The marriage of any persons either of whom has been previously married and
whose previous marriage has not been terminated by death or a decree of divorce.
Id. As the court pointed out, however, the consanguinity provision refers to marriages between
a "'man' with a 'wife'" and a "-woman' with a 'husband.'" Therefore, the marriage statute is not
completely gender-neutral. Dean, 653 A.2d at 313 (footnote omitted). The couple contended,
however, that the underlying policies of this section are to prevent biological inbreeding, a pol-
icy that does not implicate same-sex couples because they cannot procreate together. Id. The
couple argued that this one exception to the gender-neutrality in the marriage statute lends
further support to their argument. Since the only exceptions are for public health policies, the
"omission of gender references in all other provisions of the marriage statute necessarily implies
that same-sex marriages are permitted." Id.
110. Id. at 313. As the court reasoned, the consanguinity provision is not limited to prohibi-
tions against biological inbreeding. While genetic diversity may be a legitimate concern, this
analysis does not explain other prohibitions. For instance, "the prohibitions against a man's
marrying his son's wife or a woman's marrying her stepfather" Id. (quoting D.C. CODE ANN. §
30-101 (1993)).
111. Id. As the court concludes:
[ilf appellants were to prevail in their statutory interpretation, the law would
permit same-sex couples to enter into some kinds of marriage relationships that
the statute forbids for opposite-sex couples, even though such relationships would
not be genetically dangerous for any kind of marriage. Indeed, if men could marry
men § 20-101 would not preclude a bi-sexual man who may have had a biological
son from marrying that son, or from marrying his own father or brother.
Id. at 313-14. The absurdity of this argument should be obvious. Two men cannot procreate, so
there is no such "genetic danger."
112. Id. at 314.
JOURNAL OF GENDER & THE LAW [Vol. 5:93
statute with references to "husband and wife,"113 and therefore, the
present marriage statute is not gender-neutral." 4  Additionally,
like previous courts addressing same-sex marriage claims,115
the court relied on the traditional meaning of marriage"6 which,
consequently, led the court to conclude that marriage requires two
people of the opposite sex.
117
113. Id. The divorce statute contains numerous references to "husband and wife." See, e.g.,
D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-904(d) (1) (1989) (granting annulment where such marriage was con-
tracted while either of the parties ... had a former wife or husband living... .") (emphasis added);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-911(1) (Supp. 1996) (requiring the "husband or udfe to pay alimony to the
other spouse ... "); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-912 (1989) (granting court authority to "retain to the
wife her right of dower in the husbands estate; and the court may, in similar circumstances, re-
tain to the husband his right of dower in the wife!s estate.") (emphasis added); D.C. CODEANN. §
16-913 (1989) ("[w]hen a divorce is granted on the application of the husband or udf the court
may require him or her to pay alimony to the other spouse...") (emphasis added); D.C. CODE
-ANN. § 16-916(a) (1989) ("[w]henever a husband or udfe shall fail or refuse to maintain his or
her needy spouse... .") (emphasis added). However, nowhere in the code is "husband" defined
as male and "wife" defined as female.
114. Dean, 653 A.2d at 315. The court also placed particular significance on the fact that
Congress enacted the divorce and marriage statutes at the same time. Thus, "when [the] legisla-
ture enacts two statutes at (the] same time and the statutes have similar subject matter and
purpose, principles of in pari wateria dictate that the statutes should be read with reference to
each other." Id. (quoting District of Columbia v. Thompson, 593 A.2d 621, 630 (D.C. 1991).
With respect to statutes, inpari matenia refers to those "relating to the same person or thing or
having a common purpose." BLAcK's LAwDICnioNAY 791 (6th ed. 1990).
115. For other cases discussing same-sex marriage, see supra note 43 and accompanying text.
116. The court emphasized the importance of construing the language of the statute "by
[its] common meaning and ordinary sense." Dean, 653 A.2d at 315 (quoting Barbour v. District
of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 499 A.2d 122, 125 (D.C. 1985)). After examining
many dictionaries, including BLACK'S LAW DiarsoNAim 972 (6th ed. 1990), BLACK's LA.W
DIcrONAIW 762 (2d ed. 1910), WEBSTER'S MODERN DICroNARY 281 (1902), and WEBSTEW'S
THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICIONARY 1384 (1986), the definitions convinced the court that
"'marriage'--both at the turn of the century when the marriage statute was enacted and in
modem times when the statute was amended-means the union of two members of the oppo-
site sex." Id. (citations omitted).
Although the court recognized that the meanings of words change over time, it limited
its inquiry to what the legislature intended marriage to mean when it enacted the statute. Id.
Additionally, the court cited previous same-sex marriage cases as precedent for its analysis. See
supra Parts IA.-B. discussing relevant cases. See eg., M.T. v.J.T., 355 A.2d 204, 207 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1976) (stating that "a lawful marriage requires the performance of a ceremonial
marriage of two persons of the opposite sex, a male and a female."); Singer v. Ham, 522 P.2d
1187, 1197 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (affirming decision that denial of a marriage license to a
same-sex couple is required by state law and allowed by State and Federal Constitutions);Jones
v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973) (finding that by definition a lesbian cou-
ple is incapable of entering into a marriage); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 187 (Minn.
1971) (holding that an interpretation of a marriage statute as applying only to opposite-sex
couples was not a violation of the Constitution).
Interestingly, the court did not rely on the recent decision by the Hawaii Supreme
Court. The court noted "ta]lthough the Supreme Court of Hawaii, in Baehr v. Lein ... recently
reversed a trial court decision barring same-sex marriages and remanded for further proceed-
ings, the court's opinion was premised on state constitulionalground, not on statutoy interpretation
'applying an evolvingdefinition ofmarriag. Dean, 653 A.2d at 316 n.13 (citation omitted) (emphasis
added).
117. Dean, 653 A.2d at 316 (relying on other same-sex marriage cases as "analytical support"
for conclusion that marriage is between a man and a woman).
Fall 1996] GOIN' TO THE CHAPEL
Appellants argued in the alternative that the D.C. Council sought
to reinterpret the statutory definition of marriage through Anti-Sex
Discriminatory Language legislation and the Gender Rule of
Construction.
18
Examining the legislative history of the 1976 Anti-Sex
Discriminatory Language legislation clarified for the court the intent
of the Council in enacting this piece of legislation." 9 Essentially, the
Council intended this legislation to create equality between but not
among the sexes.120 Accordingly, the court reasoned that "[tihere
was not a hint that the legislation was intended to give one class of
males, e.g., gay men, an equality with another class of males, e.g.,
heterosexual men."1
21
Furthermore, adoption of the Gender Rule of Construction 22
does not require an interpretation that the statute authorizes same-
118. Id. at 316-17. The first piece of legislation the court examined was the Anti-
DiscriminatoryLanguage Act of 1976. I"& at 316. The legislature enacted this statute to "achieve
equality under the law for men and women by eliminating sex-based distinctions in the District
of Columbia Code, so that the rights and responsibilities of persons under D.C. law vill not be
different solely on the basis of their sex." Id. at 316 (citations omitted). Ironically, the legislature
considered this piece of legislation at the same time that Councilmember Dixon's bill 1-89 was
pending. Bill 1-89 would have impllcitiy authorized same-sex marriages. IR at 312. See also supra
note 104, for a discussion of Bill 1-89. Since these two bills were pending at the same time, the
Council explained the relationship betveen the two pieces of legislation by stating that the only
purpose of Bill 1-26 was to "make the law equal in effect for males and females ..." Dean, 653
A.2d at 216.
119. Dean, 653A.2datl7.
120. Id. (concluding from the Committee on the Judiciary and Criminal Law's report that
the statutory change was meant to make the two statutes consistent with each other).
121. Id.
122. The Gender Rule of Construction states that "[u]nless the Council of the District of
Columbia specifically provides that this section shall be inapplicable to a particular act or sec-
tion, all the words thereof importing one gender include and apply to the other gender as well."
D.C. CODE ANN. § 49-203 (1990). The couple's argument specifically focused on the 1901 Rule
of Gender Construction. Because the 1982 enactment deleted the words "except where such
construction would be absurd or unreasonable" and the new enactment did not provide a
"disclaimer" with respect to same-sex marriages, Dean and Gill argued that the Council author-
ized same-sex unions. Dean, 653 A.2d at 317.
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sex marriages. As the court reasoned,123 if the legislature had
intended such a change, the legislature "surely would have
mentioned such a significant intention in the legislative history of
the statute implementing the new Gender Rule of Construction."124
The court concluded that they could not construe the sanctioning of
same-sex marriages by the legislature from the language in the
Gender Rule of Construction. 125
B. The Human Rights Act Did Not Redefine Marriage
Dean and Gill also alleged that the Clerk of the Court's refusal to
issue them a marriage license discriminated against them in violation
of the Human Rights Act of the District of Columbia.126 In turn, they
argued that because the Marriage License Bureau is a place of public
accommodation, and failure to provide this service impedes same-sex
couples from participating in this aspect of life, 127 i.e., an aspect
123. According to the court, the legislative history simply does not support the appellants'
assumption that removing the language "except where such construction would be absurd or
unreasonable" implicitly authorizes same-sex marriages. Dean 653 A.2d at 318 (quoting original
Rule of Gender Construction, D.C. CODEANN. § 49-203, 31 Stat. 1189 (1901)). Apparently, the
original 1901 Gender Rule of Construction was "deficient because it did not apply to feminine
gender words--e.g., the word 'steward' in a statute would be construed to include a
'stewardess,' whereas the word 'stewardess' in a statute would not be construed to apply to a
'steward ...'" Id. at 317. (quoting D.C. CODE ANN. § 49-203 (1901)). The 1901 version provided
that "words importing the masculine gender shall be held to include all genders, except where
such construction would be absurd or unreasonable. Id. (quoting D.C. CODE ANN. § 49-203
(1901)). Conversely, the 1975 code provides that "for the purposes of any act or resolution of
the Council of the District of Columbia, unless specifically provided otherwise 'words importing
one gender include and apply to all genders as well.'" Id. (quoting D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-203
(1975)). Additionally, the 1901 version of the Gender Rule of Construction had a different cri-
teria than the 1975 Gender Rule of Construction for "determining when the Gender Rule of
Construction [would] not apply." Id. at 318 (citations omitted). Consequently, the Council's
removal of the "absurd or unreasonable" language comports with the legislative intent to make
the 1901 legislation consistent with its 1975 counterpart when the Council enacted the 1982
Gender Rule of Construction. Id. at 318.
124. Id. at 318.
125. Id.
126. Id. The intent behind enacting the Human Rights Act, D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2501 to -
2557 (1992 & Supp. 1996), was to "secure an end in the District of Columbia to discrimination
for any reason other than that of individual merit, including, but not limited to, discrimination
by reason of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, age, marital status, personal appearance,
sexual orientation, family responsbilities ..." D.C. CoDE ANN. § 1-2501 (1992).
127. The Code states that it is unlawful to discriminate in a place of public accommodation:
It shall be unlawful discriminatory practice to do any of the following acts, wholly
or partially for a discriminatory reason based on the race, color, religion, national
origin, sex, age, marital status, personal appearance, sexual orientation ... to
deny, directly or indirectly, any person the full and equal enjoyment of the goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of
public accommodations.
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reserved exclusively for heterosexuals. 128 The District did concede,
for the sake of argument, that the Marriage License Bureau is a
"place of public accommodation."12 9 The court concluded, however,
that the legislature did not enact the Human Rights Act to eliminate
every form of discrimination.13 0 Furthermore, the court opined, if
the "Council intended to effect such a major definitional change,
counter common understanding, we would expect some mention of
it in the Human Rights Act or at least in its legislative history."13'
C. Constitutional Claims
1. Due Process Rights
The court agreed that denying lesbians and gays a right to marry
did not violate fundamental due process rights. 13 2 The court split,
however, over the equal protection claim.133 Both Judge Terry and
Judge Steadman agreed that the equal protection claim was simply
not an issue, while Judge Ferren vigorously asserted that the equal
protection challenge warranted remanding the case for trial.134
D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2519(a) (1) (1992 & Supp. 1996). A place of public accommodation is de-
fined as "all places included in the meaning of such terms as hotels ... restaurants or eating
houses ... wholesale or retail stores ... banks, savings and loans associations ... clinics, hospitals
.. amusement and recreation parks ... agencies or bureaus ... public halls and public elevators
of buildings and structures ... ." Id. at § 1-2502(24).
128. Dean, 653 A.2d at 318. The code states that "[elvery individual shall have an equal op-
portunity to participate fully in the economic, cultural and intellectual life of the District and to
have an equal opportunity to participate in all aspects of life, including but not limited to, in
employment, in places of public accommodation, resort or amusement, in educational institu-
tions, in public service ..." D.C. CODEANN. § 1-2511 (1992).
129. Dean, 653 A.2d at 319.
130. Id. The court relied heavily on its decision in National Org.for Women v. Mutual of Omaha
Is. Co., 531 A.2d 274 (D.C. 1987) [hereinafter NOWJ to conclude that the Human Rights Act
did not seek to eliminate every discriminatory practice. In NOW, the court held that the Human
Rights Act did not prohibit discriminatory actuarial pricing practices by insurance companies. Id.
at 279. As the court stated, "[i]f the Council had intended to effect such a dramatic change in
insurance rate-setting practices, it is reasonable to assume that there would have been at least
some specific reference to it in the language of the act or its legislative history." Dean, 653 A.2d
at 319 (quoting NOW, 531 A.2d at 276).
131. Dean, 653 A.2d at 320 (quoting NOW, 531 A.2d at 276). Interestingly, the court also re-
lied on the circular reasoning in Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d at 1192. See also discussion supra notes
54-57. Thus the Human Rights Act, like the Washington ERA, can not protect against discrimi-
nation against same-sex couples seeking marriage rights because "marriage" requires persons of
the opposite sex. Dean, 653 A.2d at 320. Additionally, since the Council discussed the Marriage
and Divorce Act and the Human Rights Act at the same time, the court reasoned that Council-
members would have expressly stated that the Human Rights Act would permit same-sex mar-
riages even though the Marriage and Divorce Act did not, if that was their intention. Id.
132. Dean, 653 A.2d at 333.
133. I.
134. Id. at 361-62 (Ferren,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
116 JOURNAL OF GENDER & THE LAW [Vol. 5:93
The couple did not press only their statutory interpretation
arguments.135 Dean and Gill alternatively argued that the limitation
of marriage to heterosexual couples would not survive constitutional
scrutiny.13 6 The Court of Appeals first determined that the couple
properly raised the constitutional arguments on appeal.137
Predictably, however, the Court of Appeals rejected both of their due
process and equal protection claims. 13 8 Dean and Gill first alleged
that the interpretation of the marriage statute as well as the
interpretation of marriage as an institution limited to different-sex
couples "unconstitutionally burdens gays' and lesbians'
'fundamental right' to marry as they choose-a right protected by
the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment."139  In order to
evaluate the due process claims, the court traced the development of
"fundamental rights" protected by the Due Process Clause. Over the
years, the Supreme Court has developed a continuum of
fundamental right. formulations under the due process clause.140
The court in Dean noted, however, that locating the exact point on
this continuum is irrelevant because Dean and Gill's due process
claims fail "even under [the] most inclusive definition of
135. Id. at 320. In appellants' motion for summaryjudgment, they argued that the "marriage
statute 'should be read, if it can be, so as to avoid difficult and sensitive constitutional ques-
tions.'" Id. at 320 (quoting Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. v. Georgetown
Univ., 536 A.2d 1, 16 (D.C. 1987) (en banc)).
136. Id. (arguing that the District's interpretation of the Marriage Statute violates the Equal
Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause of the Constitution).
137. Dean, 653 A.2d at 321.
138. Id at 331,361.
139. Id. at 331.
140. Id. at 331 nn. 26 -27. The Dean court noted that the Supreme Court initially character-
ized fundamental rights as "those privileges and immunities that belong to someone as a citizen
of the United States--and thus cannot be denied by the states-because they are 'implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty.'" Id. at 331 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325
(1937)). This characterization led to the development of a test that fundamental rights are
those that are "so incorporated, and thus binding on the states, as those having their 'sources in
the belief that neither liberty norjustice would exist if they were sacrificed.'" Id. (footnote omit-
ted) (quoting Palko, 302 U.S. at 326). In Duncan v. Loudana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968), the
PaLko Court noted that "trial byjury in criminal cases is fundamental to the American scheme of
justice ... " Dean, 653 A.2d at 331 (citation omitted). "This new test meant that the Court would
be willing to enforce values which the justices saw as having a special importance in the devel-
opment of individual liberty in American society, whether or not the value was one that was
theoretically necessary in any system of democratic government." Id. at 331 n.27 (quotingJOHN
E. NOWAX, CONSriTUTIONAL LAW 455 (1983)). In Moore v. City of East Ckueland, 431 U.S. 494
(1977), the Court overturned a housing ordinance that prevented certain members of a family
from living together. The Court stated that the Due Process Clause "protects the sanctity of the
family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's History
and tradition." Dean, 653 A.2d at 331 (quoting Moore 431 U.S. at 503). Finally, the Court in
Bowers v. Hardwick, refused to recognize a fundamental right to engage in consensual adult ho-
mosexual sodomy. The Court thereby concluded that neither of the due process formulations
from Palko and Moore would "extend a fundamental right to homosexuals to engage in acts of
sodomy." Dean, 653 A.2d at 332 (quoting Bowers, 474 U.S. 186,191-92 (1986)).
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'fundamental right[s].'"141
Additionally, the court traced the evolution of the right to
marry.142 Although the Supreme Court has recognized the right to
marry as an inherent personal right,143 this right has been
inextricably intertwined with procreation.144  Consequently, naming
procreation, i.e., the biological capacity of a married couple to
create offspring, as the primary purpose of marriage is used as a tool
for excluding same-sex couples from entering into marriage.145
Although the Dean court graciously acknowledged that same-sex
couples can have children through means such as "adoption,
surrogacy, and artificial insemination,"146 and that not every
heterosexual can or chooses to have children, it could not "overlook
the fact that the Supreme Court in recognizing a fundamental right
to marry ... has only contemplated marriages between persons of
opposite sexes-persons who had the possibility of having children
with each other."147 Moreover, the court stated, "we cannot say that
141. Dean, 653 A.2d at 332.
142. Id. at 332-33 (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (holding that a state law
preventing parents with outstanding child support obligations from marrying to be a violation of
equal protection). Sew also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (finding a state law preventing
marriage between people of different races to be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause and
the Due Process Clause); Skinnerv. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (declaring a state law allow-
ing for the sterilization of "habitual criminals" a violation of the Equal Protection Clause).
143. Dean, 653 A.2d at 332 (citing Loving 388 U.S. at 12). Over time, the Supreme Court has
slowly crafted the institution of marriage. First, the state has long been a steward over the insti-
tution of marriage. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888). In Maynard, the Court defined mar-
riage as "the most important relation" and as "the foundation of the fhmily and of society, with-
out which there would be neither civilization or progress." Ict at 205-11. The Supreme Court
discussed the importance of marriage in Skinnerv. Oklahoma exr el Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541
(1942) whereby the Court struck down a state statute permitting the state to sterilize habitual
offenders against their will by stating that marriage is "one of the basic civil rights of man... "
Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race." The
Court in Loving v. Virginia; 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967), struck down a Virginia anti-miscegenation
statute banning interracial marriages. The Court noted that "[tihe freedom to marry has long
been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness
by free men [sici." Id. In Zablorki v. Redhai4 434 U.S. 374, 390-91 (1978), the Court struck down
a statute that prohibited an individual owing child support from obtaining a marriage license.
Id. at 384. The Court stressed the relationship between the right of privacy and the right to
marry, stating that"the right to marry is part of the fundamental 'right of privacy' implicit in the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause." rd. The Court further elaborated that
[iut is not surprising that the decision to marry has been placed on the same level
of importance as decisions relating to procreation, childbirth, child rearing, and
family relationships ... it would make little sense to recognize a right to privacy
with respect to other matters of family life and not with respect to the decision to
enter the relationship that is the foundation of the family in our society....
Id. at 386.
144. Dean, 653 A.2d at 332.
145. Id. at 333.
146. Id. See also supra note 26.
147. Dean, 653A.2dat333.
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same-sex marriage 'is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition."1 4
8
2. The Equal Protection Claim
a. Concurring Opinion byJudge Steadman
Judge Steadman argued that the exclusion of same-sex couples
from marriage did not trigger an equal protection claim.149 Judge
Steadman viewed the marriage statute as a "statute of inclusion of
opposite-sex couples ... [t]o the extent it is exclusive, it is exclusive
evenly of all same-sex couples .... "150 Judge Steadman's primary
criticism of Judge Ferren's equal protection analysis centered on
Judge Ferren's assumption that the "marriage statute [is] the
equivalent of a statute expressly addressed to an assertedly suspect
class."151 Judge Steadman therefore drew a distinction between the
marriage statute and legislation that purposively and invidiously
discriminated against lesbians and gay men.152 Additionally, Judge
Steadman further reasoned that even assuming as Judge Ferren
does, that homosexuals constitute a quasi-suspect class, the
government exhibited the requisite "important" interests to prohibit
same-sex marriages because marriage is inextricably linked to
procreation. 153 Moreover, Judge Steadman noted that extending
marital rights to individuals who presumably engage in conduct that
148. I& (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)). The court
noted that it could reach this decision without reference to the decision in Bowers. Id. at 383. See
supra note 134.
149. Dean, 653 A.2d at 363-64 (Steadmanj., concurring). Judge Steadman opined:
It seems to me apparent that much the same considerations that elevate opposite-
sex marriage to the status of a fundamental right constitute the requisite substan-
tial relationship to an important governmental interest of a statute designed to
recognize and promote that fundamental right. Surely, if only opposite-sex mar-
riage is a fundamental right, the state may give separate recognition solely to that
institution through a marriage act as here.
150. Id. at 362.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 362-63 (citing Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1350 (Colo. 1994) (en banc)
(holding that the state failed to establish that Amendment 2, which prohibited municipalities
and state from passing legislation to protect homosexual rights, served "any compelling gov-
ernmental interest in a narrowly tailored way." Therefore, Amendment 2 violated the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
153. Id. at 363-64 (footnotes omitted). By emphasizing the importance of procreation in
relation to marriage, Judge Steadman effectively disregards the other attributes of marriage
that, according to Judge Ferren, create an equal protection claim for same-sex couples. AsJudge
Steadman stated, "I do not think that the existence of other aspects of marriage with which the
state cannot impermissably interfere negates the importance of the basic considerations ex-
pressed." Id. at 363 n.4. But see supra Part II.C.2.c.ii. Judge Ferren identified numerous attrib-
utes of marriage besides procreation, including governmental benefits, physical consummation,
and emotional support, which all support an equal protection claim. Id. at 335-36.
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the state banned seemed absurd.15
b. Concurring Opinion by Judge Tery
According to Judge Terry, the nature of marriage itself precludes
an equal protection claim.155 He made an assertion, debatable at
best, that "homosexuality is an immutable trait,"156 and thus
concluded that "the equal protection claim was moot."157 As he
posited, it would be "inherently inconsistent" to conclude that
marriage is limited to different sex couples and then conclude that
there may be "a denial of equal protection."158 In other words, since
the court found that marriage requires two persons of the opposite
sex, "no court can say that a refusal to allow a same-sex couple to
'marry' could ever be a denial of equal protection."159 Moreover,
Judge Terry suggested that the remedy for the appellants lies within
the legislature and not the courts.160 Judge Terry concluded by
stating that the appellants were "free to refer to their relationship by
whatever name they wish. But it is not a marriage, and calling it a
marriage will not make it one."161
c. Dissent by Judge Ferren
(i) Criticism of the Equal Protection Ruling
Essentially, Judge Terry dismissed the equal protection claim
because marriage traditionally excludes same-sex couples.162 Judge
Ferren criticized this reasoning because Judge Terry failed to
account for the other qualities of marriage that the state denies to
homosexuals such as emotional support, religious significance, and
governmental benefits that in fact produce an equal protection claim
154. SeeDean, 653 A.2d at 364 n.5 (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186,196 (1986).
155. Id. at 261 (TerryJ., concurring).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 361 (Terryj., concurring).
158. Id. at 262 (TerryJ., concurring).
159. Dean, 653 A.2d at 361 (TerryJ., concurring).
160. Id. HenceJudge Terry suggested that the appellants should pursue some type of do-
mestic partnership legislation that would accord the couple the same benefits of marriage. Id.
But see infra notes 159 and 191 (discussing failure to keep domestic partnership legislation alive
in the District of Columbia).
161. Id. at 362 (TerryJ., concurring).
162. Id. at 861.
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for same-sex couples. 163
Judge Ferren attackedJudge Steadman's analysis for several other
reasons as well. First, Judge Ferren found it logically unsound to
conclude that the marriage statute was not discriminatory if the
legislature never "dreamed that anyone might consider it
discriminatory legislation against homosexuals. 164 Simply put, the
fact that the legislature never imagined the discriminatory
ramifications of the statute does not prevent the statute from having
a discriminatory effect on gays and lesbians.165 Second,Judge Ferren
disagreed with the authority thatJudge Steadman relied on to reject
the equal protection argument.166 In Judge Ferren's opinion, those
cases bore no relation to Dean and Gill's situation.167 As Judge
Ferren argued, those governmental actions did not seek "to exclude
the affected classes altogether from the benefits sought."'168 Lesbians
and gays are not only forbidden to marry, but the state denies them
all of the benefits that heterosexuals gain from marriage.169 Third,
Judge Steadman reasoned that the relationship between procreation
and marriage qualifies as an "important" state interest to prohibit
same-sex marriages.170 Judge Ferren asserted that this "relationship"
does not serve as a compelling or even a substantial state interest.
171
Moreover, whether legal recognition of this relationship qualifies as
a compelling state interest is certainly a matter to be decided in trial
and not summary judgment.172
163. See Dean, 653 A.2d at 359. See infra note 166. In his critique, Judge Ferren compares
Judge Terry's reasoning to the same flawed reasoning adopted by the trial court in- Loving in
which the "divine order forbids interracial marriage to the point of making it conceptually un-
thinkable." Id. at 359.




168. Id. at 360 (refering specifically to Davis which did not allow racial minorities who
passed the test to be appointed as police officers and Feeny which allowed veterans who were
female to be preferred).
169. Id. See also infra note 242. Moreover, homosexuals in the District of Columbia are also
unable to attain such benefits from other alternatives such as domestic partnership legislation.
Although the District acted to pass such legislation, the program has been unfunded for the
past four years. Lisa Nevans, Panels to Produce D.C. Budgeg Walsh Expected to Produce Bi4 WASH.
TINMS, Sept. 11, 1995, atA6.
170. Dean, 653 A.2d at 360-61.
171. See infra Part mI.C.2.c.v.
172. Dean, 653 A.2d at 361.
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(ii) Critical Overview of the Decision
Judge Ferren173 embarked on an exhaustive analysis of the the
couple's equal protection claim because the failure to assert a viable
due process claim does not automatically dispose the equal
protection claim.174 Even if marriage is fundamental right reserved
for heterosexuals, there are other privileges from marriage that must
not be ignored which are just as desired by same-sex couples as they
are by straight couples, e.g., governmental benefits, parental and
adoptive rights, emotional support, physical intimacy, religious and
173. This case, however, presented a unique problem on appeal because the parties' cross-
motions focused on a question of law based upon undisputed "adjudicative" facts. Judge Ferren
discussed in detail the difference between adjudicative facts and legislative facts. Adjudicative
facts are simply those facts that "explain who did what, when, where, how, and with what motive
and intent." I. at 322. (quoting State v. Erickson, 574 P.2d 1, 4 (Alaska 1978)). The adjudicative
facts on the record are:
appellants are both men; they are residents of the District; they are not disquali-
fied by any of the enumerated prohibitions by any of the enumerated prohibitions
under the marriage statute; they applied for a marriage license from the District's
Marriage License Bureau, presenting valid blood tests and the name of an author-
ized person willing to perform the marriage ceremony; the Clerk of the Superior
Court denied them a marriage license solely on the ground that the District of Co-
lumbia Code does not authorize marriage between persons of the same-sex; they
would have been issued a marriage license if they were a heterosexual couple; and
the denial of a marriage license potentially denies them an extraordinary number
of tangible benefits, based upon marital status, enumerated in the District of Co-
lumbia Code.
Id. at 322 (footnote omitted). Since the undisputed facts on the record for appeal were insuffi-
cient to resolve the complex constitutional issues, Judge Ferren delved into legislative fact-
finding. The court discussed the importance of using legislative facts:
[I] egislative facts come into play when the court is faced with the task of deciding
a statute, statutory interpretation or the extension or restriction of a common law
rule upon grounds of policy. These policy decisions ... often hinge on social, po-
litical, economic, or scientific facts, most of which no longer fall within the classifi-
cation of irrefutable. Cases involving such decisions cannot be decided adequately
without some view by the court of the policy considerations and background upon
which the validity of a particular statute or rule is grounded.
Id. at 324. Since the appellants' constitutional claims presented no material issue of adjudicative
facts the court's task was to examine legislative facts that will include the "origins of homosexu-
ality and the extent to which it is immutable." Id. at 330. Consequently, Judge Ferren relied on
the materials presented by the parties as well as his own sources. In order to resolve the consti-
tutional issues, specifically the equal protection claim, Judge Ferren stated that he would "rely
not only on case law but also on scientific and social sources proffered by the parties-and
found on my own part." Id.
174. See Dean, 653 A.2d at 334. But see supra Part I.C.2.i-ii (discussing the concurring opin-
ions by Judge Terry andJudge Steadman). Judge Ferren noted that the appellants could have
raised the argument that same-sex marriage is a fundamental right for equal protection pur-
poses. Since they did not, he did not address that argument in his dissent. Id. at n.31 (citing
Cass R Sunstein, Seual O7ientation and the Constitution A Note on the Relationship Between Due Proc-
err and Equal Protion, 55 U. Cmi. L. REV. 1161, 1168-69 (1988)). Additionally, Judge Ferren
also made it clear that "even though a state does not withhold a right deemed 'fundamental' for
constitutional purposes, a legislative classification that withholds other significant rights and
benefits from a protected class of persons, while making those benefits available to others, can
just as surely violate the equal protection clause." Id. at 335 (citing Pyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,
216-218 (1982)).
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spiritual significance.175 Since the District denies lesbians and gays
these heterosexual privileges when it prohibits same-sex marriages,
Judge Ferren concluded that Dean and Gill had a viable equal
protection claim and the court erred in granting summary judgment
without benefit of a trial.176 Therefore, the central aim of Judge
Ferren's dissent was to discover whether homosexuals comprise a
specially protected class under the factors historically delineated by
the Supreme Court. 177 Second, Judge Ferren also sought to discover
whether the prohibition of same-sex marriages would survive a
rational basis test under equal protection analysis or even whether a
stricter or more rigorous form of review applies.178
(iii) Applying Bowers v. Hardwick
First, Judge Ferren noted that four federal courts have held that
gays and lesbians do not comprise suspect or quasi-suspect classes
based on the homophobic rhetoric of the 1986 ruling in Bowers v.
Hardwick.179 These courts, however, misapplied the Bowers decision
because Bowers was a due process case in which the "Supreme Court
175. The Supreme Court in Tuner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), held that withholding a
right to marry violated prisoner's due process rights because of the "four important attributes of
marriage." Id. at 78., that consist of emotional support, religious and spiritual significance,
physical consummation, and government benefits such as tax benefits, property rights, and so-
cial security benefits. I& at 95-96.
176. Dean, 653 A.2d at 336. The most difficult issue to resolve, however, is whether homo-
sexuals qualify as a "suspect" or "qtasi-suspec" class. Even though Judge Ferren attempted to
resolve this question through legislative fact-finding, he ultimately feels that the matter should
be resolved at trial where the court can examine record and non-record sources and expert tes-
timony. Id. at 356.
177. Id. Essentially whatJudge Ferren was really trying to ascertain was which party should
bear the burden at trial. If the court determined that homosexuals were not members of a
"suspect" or "quasi-suspect" class, then the appellants would have the burden of demonstrating
that disallowing same-sex couples to marry does not satisfy a rational basis test. Conversely, if
homosexuals qualified as a "suspect" or quasi-suspect" class, then the burden is on the govern-
ment to show that such prohibitions fulfill compelling or even substantial governmental inter-
est. I&
178. See infra Part MI.C.2.v.
179. Dean, 653A.2d at340. SeeIHigh Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d
563,570-73 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that homosexuals do not qualify as suspect or quasi-suspect
class because homosexuality is not "an immutable characteristic; it is behavioral and, hence, is
fundamentally different from traits such as race, gender, or alienage"); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh,
881 F.2d 454, 464-66 (7th Cir. 1989) (upholding Army's refusal to reenlist admitted lesbian not-
ing that "[i]f homosexual conduct may constitutionally be criminalized, then homosexuals do
not constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class for equal protection purposes"); Woodward v.
United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (holding that homosexuals as a class are not
afforded heightened scrutiny because homosexuality is primarily behavioral in nature and after
Bowers discrimination against homosexuality is not "constitutionally infirm"); Padula v. Webster,
822 F.2d 97, 102.04 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding "it would be quite anomalous, on its face, to de-
clare status defined by conduct that states may constitutionally criminalize as deserving of strict
scrutiny under the equal protection clause.").
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expressly noted it was not addressing equal protection issues." 180 As
a consequence, the decision in Bowers does not foreclose an equal
protection claim.18 1 As Judge Ferren points out, the Bowers
decision left a number of unanswered questions. 182 Ultimately, the
due process ban on consensual homosexual sodomy left open several
equal protection questions. 183 For example, the question remains
whether the state can deny homosexuals the right to marry solely
because of their sexual conduct.18 4 If this is true, then it is illogical
to allow heterosexuals to marry when they have a right to engage in
exactly the same proscribed conduct "at least when formalized in
marriage."185 An underlying premise to this question is that
heterosexuals may not have a constitutional right to engage in
sodomy, but the state honors those marriages anyway.186
(iv) Factors Relevant to Suspect and Quasi-Suspect Status
The Supreme Court has slowly expanded the types of classes
subject to legislative action that require a greater level of scrutiny for
180. Dean, 653 A.2d at 342. AccordinglyJudge Ferren stated that "this court owes them no
deference, and we would abandon ourjudicial responsibility if we accepted what, in my view, is
critically flawed reasoning." I&
181. Id at 343.
182. Id at 342-43. The Supreme Court would not rule on whether the criminalizaion of
adult homosexual sodomy would apply to heterosexuals as well. Id. at 342 (citing Bowers, 478
U.S. at 188 n.2). Furthermore, even if the state can prohibit sodomy for homosexuals and het-
erosexuals alike, it seems illogical that heterosexuals are entitled to marry where homosexuals
are not. Id. Additionally, if the state can not proscribe heterosexual sodomy because of funda-
mental privacy rights then it is not exactly obvious why the state can prohibit homosexual mar-
riage when heterosexuals use marriage to "legitimize their own consensual sodomy." Id. Even if
the state can not prohibit consensual homosexual sodomy by married couples, that does not
preclude the state from prohibiting consensual sodomy for consenting unmarried heterosexual
couples like it criminalizes fornication. Id. (footnote omitted). Assuming for the sake of argu-
ment that homosexuals are a constitutionally protected class, the question then remains
whether homosexuals can use the equal protection clause to claim a marriage right when they
"admittedly engage in ... consensual sodomy, which the state can lawfully proscribe for a large
measure of the heterosexual population, namely all unmarried opposite-sex couples." Id. Even
though the Bowers decision did not draw a distinction between married and unmarried couples,
it is feasible that it "left room for constitutionally protecting consensual sodomy in marriage
while permitting criminal penalties for consensual sodomy outside of marriage." Id. If this were
true, the appellants' argument would be buttressed because heterosexual couples could
"validate their conductr by entering marriage while homosexual couples can not. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Dean, 653 A.2d at343 (discussing criminal sodomy statutes that have traditionally drawn
no distinctions between heterosexuals and homosexuals alike and concluding that such conduct
provides no basis in itself to deny marriage to homosexual couples without denying the same to
heterosexual couples) (citation omitted).
186. _rd at344.
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equal protection analysis.187 Although the Supreme Court has never
specifically addressed the issue of whether lesbians and gays
comprise a "suspect" or "quasi-suspect" class,188 Judge Ferren opined
that these groups should qualify despite courts that have held
otherwise. 189  After examining several factors, Judge Ferren
concluded 190 that homosexuals in all probability comprise either a
suspect or a quasi-suspect class.1 91
First, Judge Ferren determined that gays and lesbians have
historically suffered from purposeful discrimination.192 Indeed,
Justice Brennan has characterized such discrimination as
"pernicious"193 and reflecting a "deep-seated prejudice rather than
187. Id. at 337. Initially, the Supreme Court in United States v. CarotneProd. Co., 304 U.S. 144
(1938) recognized that "discrete and insular minorities" were deserving of a more stringentju-
dicial inquiry. Id. at 152 n.2. The apparent underlying premise lurking in Crolene is that
heightenedjudicial inquiry is required because "such minorities lack sufficient political power to
fend for themselves in a democratic process that should, but fails, to 'generate outcomes sys-
tematically more favorable to minority interests.'" Dean, 653 A.2d at 338 (quoting Bruce A. Ack-
erman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 NARV. L REV. 713, 729 (1985)). As time progressed, the Su-
preme Court expanded the legislative classifications demanding heightened equal protection
analysis. The suspect classes requiring strict scrutiny include race, alienage and national origin.
Id. (footnotes omitted). The quasi-suspect classes requiring intermediate or heightened scru-
tiny are gender and illegitimacy. Id. (footnotes omitted).
188. Id. at 339 (citing Rowland v. Mad River Local Seh. Dist., 470 U.S. 1009 (1985)). Al-
though the Supreme Court has never addressed whether homosexuals qualifI as a suspect or
quasi-suspect class, the dissent noted that two federal courts argued that homosexuals comprise
either a suspect or quasi-suspect class. In Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 724-28 (9th
Cir. 1989) (en banc) (NorrisJ. concurring) the court concluded that homosexuals constitute a
suspect class for equal protection purposes. Another federal court held that homosexuals com-
prise a quasi-suspect class. In Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati v. Cincinnat 860 F. Supp. 417
(S.D. Ohio 1994), rev'd, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995), the court held that lesbians, gays and bi-
sexuals comprise quasi-suspect class such that any law discriminating against such individuals
would have to be narrowly drawn to fulfill sufficiently important governmental interests. Id. at
268 n.41. This decision was, however, overturned on appeal. See Equality Found. of Greater Cin-
cinnati v. Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that "Bowers v. Hardwick and its
progeny command, as a matter of law, gays, lesbians, and bisexuals cannot constitute either a
'suspect class' or a 'quasi-suspect class.'" Id. at 268.).
189. Id. at340.
190. The questions include: "(1) Has the group suffered a history of purposeful discnimina-
tion? (2) Is the class the object of such deep-seated prejudice that it is often subjected to dis-
abilities based upon inaccurate stereotypes that do not truly reflect the members' abilities? (3)
Is the class defined by the presence of an immutable trait that is beyond a class member's con-
trol andyet bears no relation to the individual's ability to contribute to society? (4) Is this group
a politically powerless minority?" Dean, 653 A.2d at 339-340 (footnotes omitted). Judge Ferren
noted that "the first two of these factors reflect a concern for stigma - for unfair stereotyping ...
the latter two focus on the ability of the group to avoid the claimed disadvantage through self-
help-the classic CaroteneProductsconcern."_Id.
191. Dean, 653 A.2d at 350.
192. Id. at 343.
193. Id. at 344 (citing Rowland v. Mad River Local School Dist., 470 U.S 1009, 1014 (1985)
(Brennan, J.,joined by Marshall,J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari). The dissenters in
Rowland vigorously argued that state action against homosexuals should be subject to strict or
heightened review.
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rationality."194 Additionally, such pervasive discrimination has led to
"the basis of refusals to hire, the ruin of careers, undesirable military
charges, denials of occupational licenses, denials of the right to
adopt and to the custody of children and visitation rights, denials of
national security clearances and denials of the right to enter the
country."195
Second, lesbians and gays are also the victims of inaccurate
stereotyping.196 Heterosexual opponents of same-sex marriages have
labeled gays and lesbians as child molesters, 197 untrustworthy, 198
promiscuous, 199 and unwilling to settle down and raise a family.200 As
Judge Ferren contends, this stereotyping not only results in an
"unfair assault on feelings but, more significantly, ... inaccurate
stereotyping typically withholds recognition of one's capacity to be a
productive member of society."
20 1
The question of whether homosexuality is immutable is the most
difficult issue to resolve. Determining whether homosexuality is
homosexuals constitute a significant and insular minority of this country's popula-
tion. Because of the immediate and severe opprobrium often manifested against
homosexuals once so identified publicly, members of this group are particularly
powerless to pursue their rights openly in the political arena. Moreover, homo-
sexuals have historically been the object of pernicious and sustained hostility, and
it is fair to say that discrimination against homosexuals is 'likely to reflect deep-
seated prejudice rather than rationality'.
Rowland, 470 U.S. at 1014 (citations omitted).
194. Dean, 653 A.2d at 344.
195. Id. (citing Elvia R. Arriola, Sexual Identity and the Constitution: Homosexual Person as a Dis-
crete and InsularMinoity, 10 WoMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 143,157 (1988)).
196. Id.
197. Id at n.48. See David Russman, Alternative Families in Whose Best Interest, 27 SUFOLKU.
L. REV. 31 (1993) (discussing problems gays and lesbians have encountered due to stereotypes
in trying to adopt children, including the misconception that they will molest the children).
198. Id. at 341-45 (citing Editors of the Harvard Law Review, Developments in the Law: Sexual
Orentation and the Law, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1508, 1567 (1989)). See also Patterson, supra note 26,
at 1034 noting that:
Results of research to date suggest that children of lesbian and gay parents have a
normal relationships with peers and that their relationships with adults of both
sexes are satisfactory. In fact, the findings suggest that children in custody of di-
vorced lesbian mothers have more frequent contact with their fathers than do
children in custody of divorced heterosexual mothers. There is no evidence to suggest
that children of lesbian or gay parents are at a greater risk of sexual abuse than other chil-
dren. The picture of lesbian mothers' children that emerges from results of exist-
ing research is thus one of general engagement in social life with peers, with fa-
thers, and with mothers' adult friends-both female and male, both homosexual
and heterosexual.
Itd (emphasis added).
199. Dean, 653 A.2d at 344-45 n.27 (citing ABA Annual MeetingProvides Forum for Family Law
Experts, 13 Farn. L. Rep. (BNA) 1512,1513 (1987).
200. Dean, 653 A.2d at 345. But seesupra notes 26 and 182.
201. Id. (citingFrontierov. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973)).
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immutable is necessary because every Supreme Court decision
granting suspect or quasi-suspect class status has always been based
on an immutable trait.20 2 Additionally, if homosexuality has a
"genetic origin like race or gender, court[s] would be sympathetic to
arguments that any statute forbidding same-sex marriage should be
subject to 'strict' or at least 'intermediate scrutiny"' whereas if sexual
orientation "were entirely a learned, and thus psychological
phenomenon-and were subject to change ... then the statute would
be reviewable under the rational basis test."203
At this point in time, however, there is simply no definitive answer
on whether homosexuality is immutable.20 4 Nonetheless, Judge
Ferren decided that homosexuality is immutable20 5 like "race or
gender for equal protection analysis." 20 6 Accordingly, Judge Ferren
rebuffed many theories suggesting that homosexuality may be a
chosen or preferred sexual orientation.20 7 Thus, he was unwilling to
accept the majority's implicit belief that "traumatic, possibly
emotionally destructive self-help, rather than constitutional
protection is the price that homosexuals must pay ... to avoid
pernicious discrimination. Indeed, increasing use of gene therapy
and drugs to manipulate health and human behavior suggests the
quite scary spectre of enforcing a public policy for curing [sic]
202. Id at 346. (footnotes omitted). As a consequenceJudge Ferren noted that it would be
difficult to recognize homosexuals as suspect or quasi-suspect if their sexual orientation is not
immutable. IM
203. Id.
204. See id at 348. Judge Ferren examined research on both sides of this issue. Generally, as
far as Judge Ferren could ascertain, there is no conclusive scientific evidence pinpointing the
origins of homosexuality. Theories range from homosexuality being genetically determined,
culturally determined, environmentally determined, hormones interacting with social and envi-
ronmental factors. Id. at 347 at nA9. Additionally, other theories purport that homosexuality
can be changed through religious conversion, shock therapy and other treatments. Id: See also
Janet E. Halley, Sexual Ozientation and the Politics of.Biology: A Citique of the Argument from Immuta-
i~y, 46 STAN. L. REV. 503 (1994) (warning queer rights advocates from relying too heavily on
recent scientific evidence claiming that homosexuality is immutable).
205. Dean, 653 A.2d at 352. After examining recorded and non-recorded sources, Judge Fer-
ren concluded that "homosexuality is not a whim; it fails within the a range from biological
(genetic and/or hormonal) to psychological predisposition that is very difficult, if not impossi-
ble, to reverse." Id. Although Judge Ferren firmly believed that homosexuality is virtually un-
changeable unless drastic measures are taken, he still questioned whether there was some de-
terrent value to forbidding same-sex marriages. Thus, as some courts have postulated,
homosexuality should not be endorsed because a homosexual role model may influence a
child's developing sexual identity. Id. at 353 (citing Opinion ofJustices, 530 A.2d 21,25 (1987)).
Judge Ferren found, however, that there were a substantial number of courts as well as scientific
evidence that have proved otherwise. "Research ... in cases concerning efforts to adopt children
indicates there is 'little ground' for concern that 'children might become homosexual if raised
in a lesbian or gay household.'" Id. (citingJoseph Harry, Gay Male and Lesbian Relationships, in
CONT. PAM. &ALTERNATMWL1FEsr 216, 229 (EleanorD. Macklin ed., 1983)).
206. Id. at 352.
207. Id. at 546-48 na9.
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homosexuals.... "208
Finally, Judge Ferren concluded that homosexuals represent a
politically powerless group.209 Despite the increasing political power
of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered rights movements
over the years, homosexuals still remain a politically powerless
minority.210 Not only has Congress effectively killed domestic
partnership legislation in the District of Columbia by not funding
the program,21' but lesbians and gays have had little success in
procuring legislative protection from discrimination nationaly.212
v. Lesbians and Gays as Suspect or Quasi-Suspect Classes
Under Judge Ferren's analysis, if a trial court determines that gays
and lesbians do not comprise suspect or quasi-suspect classes, then
Dean and Gill, all same-sex couples, cannot overcome the rational
basis test.2 13 Moreover, if the central purpose of marriage is
procreation,2 14 the state's limitation of marriage to heterosexuals is
rationally related to that goal.215 Conversely, if a court concludes
208. Id. at 352 (emphasis added).
209. Irdat349.
210. Dea 653 A.2d at 349. SeeKevin Aloysius Zambrowicz, To Honor You AlU theDays of Your
L&fe. A Constitutional Right toSame-SexMariage 43 CATH. L REV. 967,938-39 (1994) noting that:
although gays have experienced a long history of discrimination and have the
abilities to contribute to society, courts are reluctant to characterize gays as politi-
cally impotent or as possessing an immutable characteristic. Any hope of granting
same-sex couples the fundamental right to marry will not lie with designating ho-
mosexuality as a suspect classification. Courts are reluctant to enter into the po-
litical whirlvind that surrounds homosexuality. Homosexuality is not poised on
the brink of acceptance as a suspect classification.
Id. at 940 (footnotes omitted). One scholar notes that homosexuals possess even less political
power than other discrete and insular minorities such as "African Americans, a protected racial
minority." Dean, 653 A.2d at 349. Another argument is that many homosexuals can conceal their
identity in order to minimize the impact of prejudice therefore, many homosexuals remain
"anonymous and diffuse" as opposed to "discrete and insular." Id. at 351.
211. Domestic partnership legislation has been repeatedly blocked in the District of Colum-
bia. The House voted to remove funding for the District's Domestic Partners law by a vote of 251
for and 176 against. See Congressional Roll Call VIRGINIAN PILoT, July 17, 1994, at A8.
212. See Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1350 (Colo. 1994) (en banc) (holding that state
failed to demonstrate that Amendment 2 served any compelling governmental interest in a nar-
rowly tailored way. Thus, Amendment 2 interfered with the fundamental right of lesbians and
gays to participate in the political process. Other states that have put anti-gay initiatives on the
ballots include: Arizona, Missouri, Oregon, Washington, Nevada, Idaho and Michigan. States
that enacted legislation to protect gay rights includes: Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey,
California, Hawaii, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Vermont and the District of Columbia. Bettina Boxall,
Anti-Ga)y.dghts Measures Ignite Aggressive Battles in 7 States, L . TIMES, Jun. 9, 1994, at A5. See also
supra note 173.
213. Under a rational basis test, the marriage statute must be upheld if there is any
"reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification."
Dean, 653 A.2d at 336 (citations omitted).
214. Id at336. 1Butseesupranotes 165-66.
215. Dean, 653 A.2d at 336-37.
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that gays and lesbians do qualify as suspect or quasi-suspect classes,
then the state cannot prove that such discrimination meets a
compelling or even a substantial governmental interest.2 16 Even if a
court decides sexual orientation is immutable, the only feasible
reasons to continue discriminating against lesbians and gays would
be because of a "deterrence theory"217  or adverse public
sentiment218 Nevertheless, either of these scenarios entitled Dean
and Gill to a trial on this matter.
IV. CRITIQUE OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE ARGUMENTS
It is problematic to conclude that the legislature considered same-
sex marriages when it first drafted the marriage statute in 1901.219
Consequently, the Dean court may have correctly concluded that the
marriage statute, as codified in 1901, does not include same-sex
marriage rights.220 Despite the fact that the District of Columbia's
marriage statute enacted in 1901 does not embody same-sex
marriage'rights, however, the court should have considered marriage
as an evolving institution. 221 Therefore, the court in Dean should
have examined the marriage statute in the context of 1990's ideals
instead of those in 1901. Additionally, the court incorrectly limited
the scope of the Human Rights Act because lawmakers adopted the
Act to eradicate discrimination based upon sex and sexual
orientation.222
Finally, the court incorrectly dismissed the couple's due process
and equal protection claims.223 The judges erred in rejecting the
216. Id.
217. Seesupranotes 182, 185. As Judge Ferren concludes, if there is any truth to the deter-
rence theory that legitimizing homosexual behavior could influence a child's sexual identity,
the state interest may be substantial enough to forbid same-sex marriages, "even though not
substantial enough to allow discrimination, for example, in housing or employment." Dean, 653
A.2d at 355.
218. Dean, 653 A. 2d at 355 n.61. The government would have to demonstrate that there
would be a "predictable increase in antisocial homosexual behavior ... mere feeling of distaste
or revulsion at what someone else is or does, simply does not offend majority values without
causing concrete harm, cannotjustify inherently discriminatory legislation against members of a
constitutionally protected class." Id. (footnote omitted).
219. See supra notes 24, 39. The court points to one particular section of the marriage stat-
ute where the is a noticeable lack of gender neutrality, the consanguinity provision. D.C. CODE
ANN. § 30-101 (1995). The provision refers to marriages of a "man" with a "wife" and of a
"woman" with a"husband." Dean, 653 A.2d at 312.
220. Seesupranotes 16-18, 92.
221. See supra notes 26, 51 for a discussion on the numerous means by which lesbians and
gays have children biologically or otherwise. See also MARTHA FINEMAN, THE NEUTEIRED
MoTHER: THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TENTIETH CENTURv TRAGEDIES (1995) (discussing
the drastically changing definitions of family in both societal treatment and law).
222. See infra Parts I.B., 1V.B.
223. Dean, 653 A.2d at 333.
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due process claims because they assumed that the institution of
marriage is a fundamental right only because of its link to
procreation.2 24 Also, the court erred in granting the District motion
for summary judgement on the equal protection claim precisely
because the prohibition of same-sex marriages is impermissible
sexual discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
225
A. Effectiveness of Statutory Arguments
The decision in Dean does not, in many respects, represent a
significant departure from other leading cases dismissing same-sex
marriage claims.226 Although Dean and Gill attempted to avoid
complex constitutional issues227  by propounding statutory
interpretation arguments focusing on the gender-neutral language
of the marriage statute,228 the Dean court correctly ruled that the
Marriage Statute as codified in 1901, did not embody a same-sex
marriage right
2 29
First, the legislative history of the marriage statute and the
language of the divorce statute provides clear evidence that the
legislature only contemplated different-sex marriages when it
enacted the statutes.230 The divorce statute the legislature enacted
along with the marriage statute is replete with references to
"husband and wife,"2 1 but the debate over the amendments to the
marriage statute dearly indicates that the Council at the time
rejected a same-sex marriage right.232 Second, the consanguinity
provision of the marriage statute reflects more than just a concern
for "biological inbreeding."233  As the court noted, if the only
concern in enacting this provision was "biological inbreeding," then
the statute would not have forbidden some couples from marrying
because they could not possibly pose a risk of producing children
with birth defects. 234 The court concludes that the "consanguinity
224. rd. at 332-33.
225. Id. at335-36.
226. Sea inftanotes 42,49 and Part IA-D.
227. Dean, 653 A.2d at 320-21.
228. Id. at 310.
229. Smsupra note 219.
230. Dean, 653 A.2d at 312-14.
231. Here, I wil assume that "husband" refers only to men and "wife" refers only to women.
Of course, some same-sex couples embrace both terms, others reject both to define themselves.
232. SeesupraPartI.A. and notes 113-17.
233. Dean, 653 A.2d at 313.
234. Id. at 313.
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provision therefore reflects taboos-indeed moral judgments about
improper marriage relationships that transcend genetic
concerns."23 5
Even though the court ruled that the marriage statute as codified
in 1901, excluded lesbians and gays from marital privileges, the
court failed to consider the possibility that the institution of
marriage has evolved over time to such an extent that it should
embody same-sex marriages.2 6 Consider, for instance, the changing
form of American families. The nature of the American family has
not remained in the static form of a "nuclear family."237 Indeed, the
emergence and widespread acceptance of alternative family forms
signifies the necessity to adapt the meaning of family to societal
changes.238 Considering the fact that the institution of "family" has
evolved to include much more than "nuclear" families, it is not
readily apparent why the institution of marriage cannot adapt to
reflect societal changes as well.
The court placed particular emphasis on the "traditional"
meaning of marriage 23 9 and even acknowledged that "meanings of
words are continually evolving,"240 but limited its examination of
marriage to an examination of what the legislature intended in
1901.241 Logically, the court exercised judicial restraint by leaving a
new interpretation of marriage in the hands of the legislature.242
235. Id.
236. See supra note 26.
237. The traditional nuclear family with a father, mother and children that has been "a
cherished and idealized American norm for decades ... isn't so normal anymore. Nationally,
50% of all children under 18 lived in a traditional nuclear family in the summer of 1991 ...
[the other half lived with a stepparent and stepsiblings, in a single-parent household, with
other relatives or non-relatives ..." Alan Gottlieb, Nuclear Family No Longer the Nor=, DENTVR
POsT, Aug. 30, 1994, at A2. The number of children living in nuclear families in 1991 was 51%;
in 1988, it was 51%; in 1980, it was 57%; in 1970, it was 66%. Traditional Families Wane, Study
inds Half of Kids Live with BiologicaI Parents, Sibling, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 30, 1994,
at SA.
238. Seesupra note 221.
239. SeeDean, 653 A.2d at 315.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. See id. at 361. AsJudge Terry suggests:
[the solution for the appellants] lies exclusively with the legislature. The Council
of the District of Columbia can enact some sort of domestic partners law, bestow-
ing on same-sex couples the same rights already enjoyed by married couples,
whenever it wants to. But no court can order a legislature to enact a particular
statute so as to achieve a result that the court might consider as desirable, or to
appropriate money for a purpose that the court might deem unworthy of being
unfunded.
I (citing Zahn v. Board of Pub. Works, 274 U.S. 325 (1927) and Hartm. United States, 118 U.S.
62 (1886)).
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Unfortunately, by leaving a new interpretation of marriage to the
legislature, same-sex couples may never attain the same rights and
benefits that their heterosexual counterparts reap from marriage.
243
B. The Human Rights Act
The court's analysis of the Human Rights Act claim is difficult to
evaluate. On one hand, the legislative history provides no indication
that the legislature intended to dramatically change the meaning of
marriage as codified in the marriage statute.244 Conversely, the
legislature enacted the Human Rights Act to eliminate pervasive
forms of discrimination against individuals based on sex or sexual
orientation.245 The Act appears to prohibit discrimination against
same-sex couples seeking a marriage license. The court's
interpretation of the act, however, undermines its supposedly
expansive scope. That is, the court stated, the Council "undoubtedly
intended the Human Rights Act to be a powerful, flexible, and far-
reaching prohibition against discrimination of many kinds,
including sex and sexual orientation, 246 yet the court refused to
prohibit discrimination against same-sex couples who attempt to
obtain a marriage license.247 The court relied heavily on the same
"circular and unpersuasive"2 48 reasoning of Singer v. Ham. 249
The court concluded the Human Rights Act cannot protect same-sex
couples from discrimination because what they seek to enter by is
not a "marriage" by statutory definition.
250
Even if the marriage is not by definition an institution that is
open to same-sex couples, the Dean court was wrong to dismiss the
same sex couple's claim under the Human Rights Act. The clear
language of the statute mandates that public and private entities
243. Seo supranotes 160, 188 (discussing the failure to fund the domestic partnership legisla-
tion in the District of Columbia).
244. The court noted that the legislature should have made some express mention of same-
sex marriages in the act's legislative history. Dean, 653 A.2d at 320.
245. SeD.C. CODEANN. § 1-2501 (1996) (proclaiming, "Itis the intent of the Council of the
District of Columbia, in enacting this chapter, to secure an end in the District of Columbia ...to
... discrimination by reason of... sexual orientation ...")
246. Dean, 653 A.2d at 319.
247. Id at 320 (summarizing the arguments against granting same-sex couples a marriage
license).
248. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 61 (Haw. 1993) (describing the illogical reasoning in
Singer).
249. 522 P.2d 1187,1190-92 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (holding that Washington ERA does not
require the state to permit same-sex marriages because "marriage" does not entail same-sex rela-
tionships). See also supranotes 55-60.
250. Dean, 653 A.2d at 310 (stating that by definition, same-sex relationships cannot be mar-
riages because the definition of marriage requires opposite-sex partners).
Fall 1996]
132 JOURNAL OF GENDER & THE LAW [Vol. 5:93
shall not prohibit any person from participating in "all aspects of
life."251 Certainly, marriage would encompass an aspect of life if not
an "important aspect of life."252 According to the court, however,
policymakers have historically, and therefore justifiably, limited legal
recognition of marriage to heterosexual couples. Thus, without a
clear indication that the legislature intended otherwise, there is
simply no justification to redefine marriage. 53 Ultimately, the failure
of the Dean court to recognize a same-sex marriage claim under the
Human Rights Act illustrates the difficulty of recognizing same-sex
marriages under existing laws. 254
C. Constitutional Claims
1. Due Process
The Dean. court summarily rejected Dean and Gill's due process
claim for two reasons: 1) they believe the institution of marriage is
inextricably linked to procreation, and 2) same-sex marriage is not
251. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2511 (1996). The code defines "aspects of life" to "includ[e] but
not [be] limited to, in employment, in places of public accommodation, resort or amusement,
in educational institutions, in public service ..." Td.
252. Dean, 653 A.2d at 318 (reciting the couple's argument that denial of a marriage license
denies them the right to engage in an important aspect of life). See Adam Chase, Tax Planning
for Same-Sex Couples, 72 DENV. U. L REV. 359, 359 (1995) (asserting that legal marriage may cre-
ate the "most important relation in life").
253. As demonstrated by the Dean court, focusing on the legislative history and the plain
language of the statute may not be the most appropriate mechanism to ensure the protection of
gay and lesbian rights under existing laws. Instead, invoking "dynamic statutory interpretation"
may be a more useful tool when examining legislation that affects homosexuals. Dynamic statu-
tory interpretation accounts for the lack of clarity in the language and legislative history of a
statute and "assumes that an interpretation must be constructed to fit the historical and cultural
moment..." Whereas the central question of traditional theories is how framers intended the
statute to be applied, a dynamic theory asks what the statute should mean in relationship to
contemporary society." See, eg., Heidi A. Sorenson, A New Gay .Rights Agenda? Dynamic Statutoiy
Interpretation and Sexual O ntation Discrimination, 81 GEO. LJ. 2105, 2108-09 (citations omitted).
Essentially, dynamic statutory interpretation is more progressive because it focuses on the stat.
ute in the context of the present whereas traditional statutory interpretation tools construe the
meaning of the statute in the context of the past. Id. at 2106 n.9. The approach taken by the
Dean court as well as the other courts addressing same-sex marriage claims focuses on the statute
in the context of the past. See generally supra Parts I.A., rIHA Perhaps in the future, courts ad-
dressing same-sex marriage claims should invoke dynamic statutory interpretation so that the
marriage statutes and statutes proscribing discrimination based on sexual orientation can best
be understood in the context of societal changes rather than the traditions of the past.
254. By emphasizing the "traditional" meaning of marriage as reflected in the marriage stat-
ute, the court invoked the canon that a "general, later enactment" such as the Human Rights
Act" does not take precedence over an earlier more specific enactment" such as the Marriage
Act. SeeSorensen, supranote 253, at 2106 n.9 (citations omitted).
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"deeply rooted in the Nations's history and tradition."5 5 The Dean
court mistakenly assumes that marriage is a constitutionally
protected entity solely because of its link to procreation. In fact, the
Supreme Court has proclaimed that the institution of marriage
embodies much more.256  Moreover, marriage is also a
constitutionally protected right because it fosters "familial and
255. Dean, 653 A.2d at 333 (citing Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503
(1977)). The Dean court dismissed the due process claim without discussing the Bowers decision
because same-sex marriage is not "deeply rooted in the Nation's history and tradition." Dean,
653 A.2d at 333. But see Eskridge, supra note 24, at 1419 (tracing tradition and evolution of
same-se-x marriages in Western and other cultures). The decision in Bowers could also serve as a
barrier to attaining same-sex marriage rights under the due process clause. Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186 (1986). The Bowers decision, however, does not necessarily foreclose a due process
claim. S ual Orientation and theLaw, supranote 31, at 1607-08 n.23, notes that-
The Supreme Court's recent decision in [Bowers] does not foreclose application of
the privacy doctrine to same-sex marriage. Although [Bowers] held that the right
of privacy does not protect the right of homosexuals to engage in sodomy, the
right of gay men and lesbians to marry is unrelated to their right to engage in
sodomy.Just as Mormons did not forfeit the right to free exercise of religion sim-
ply because the state proscribed polygamy ... so too homosexuals do not forfeit
their fundamental right to marry because the state can proscribe sodomy .... Nor
would extending the right of privacy to protect the right of gay men and lesbians
to marry necessarily entail extending the right of privacy to protect the right of
individuals to many relatives. Incestuous relationships, unlike homosexual rela-
tionships, create a high risk of birth defects in their offspring. The state, there-
fore, has a compelling interest in regulating them.
Id. Nonetheless, the argument that sodomy laws proscribing consensual homosexual conduct
should negate a same-sex marriage claim is not valid in the District of Columbia due to the re-
peal of the sodomy laws in 1993. Dean, 653 A.2d at 334 n.30.
256. The court's holding in Turnerv. Saty, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), allowing inmates to marry,
expanded the meaning of marriage beyond procreation to encompass other important attrib-
utes including expressions of emotional support and public commitment. These elements are
an important and significant aspect of the marital relationship. In addition, many religions rec-
ognize marriage as having spiritual significance; for some inmates and their spouses, therefore,
the commitment of marriage may be an exercise of religious faith as well as an expression of
personal dedication..." Finally, marital status often is a pre-condition to the receipt of govern-
ment benefits (e.g., Social Security benefits), property rights (e.g., tenancy by the entirety, in-
heritance rights), and other, less tangible benefits (e.g., legitimation of children born out of
wedlock). Id. at 93; see also supra note 153. The Turner decision follows other Supreme Court de-
cisions indicating that marriage is independent of procreation including Griswold v. Connecti-
cut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that married persons have the right to use contraceptives be-
cause the right of privacy) rd. at 498; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1972) (upholding a woman's
decision on whether or not to have an abortion is protected as a right of privacy) Id. at 153.
Eisenstadtv. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (extending the right to use contraceptives to unmarried
persons) Id. at 454. One state court has held that an inability to procreate is not a legitimate
reason to prohibit a couple from marrying. Marks v. Marks, 77 N.Y.S.2d 269 (Kings County Su-
per. Ct. 1948). The court noted, however, that the person must be "capable of having the sex-
ual intercourse which may result in the conception and birth of children" IR. at 270-71 (citations
omitted).
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societal stability."25 7 In light of the State's interest in promoting
such stability, it is illogical for the State to forbid same-sex couples
involved in loving, committed, stable relationships and eager to raise
children, from marrying.258
Even assuming that marriage is a fundamental right solely
because of its link to procreation, arguments forbidding same-sex
couples from marrying are meritless. The Dean court held that the
Supreme Court limited the fundamental right to marry to "persons
of opposite sexes-persons who had the possibility of having
children with each other."259 Logically, if marriage is limited to
persons who had the possibility of conceiving children together,
then the State would prohibit heterosexual couples that are
biologically incapable of procreating, from marrying.260 To impose
such a limit on heterosexual couples who cannot or do not want to
have children would be heartless. Neither social mores nor the
courts have ever imposed such limitation on heterosexual couples.261
Indeed, it confounds all reason that this procreation argument
provides the basis which forbids lesbians and gays from marrying
when they have already established alternative families, including
families with children.262
257. See Sacual Orientation and the Law, supra note 31, at 1608 (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434
U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (discussing the function of marriage)). In Moore v. City of East Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494 (1977), the Court struck down a housing ordinance that prohibited an extended
family from living together. The Court stated that "[e]specially in times of adversity, such as the
death of a spouse or economic need, the broader family has tended to come together for mu-
tual sustenance and to maintain or rebuild a secure home life." Id at 505. Indeed, it is apparent
that promoting stability at home is yet another important aspect of marriage and the family.
258. See Homosexuals' Right to Many: A Constitutional Test and a Legislative Solution, supra note
31, at 213 (concluding the state has no legitimate interest in prohibiting same-sex marriage). See
generally, Maxwell S. Peltz, Second-Parent Adoption: Overcoming Barrirs to Lesbian Family Rights, 3
MxCH.J. GENDER & L 175 (1995) (referring to cases in which lesbian couples have been allowed
to adopt even though they could not marry). But see Nancy E. Dowd, Stigmatizing Single Parents,
18 Hiv. WomEN/'s L. 19,51 (1995) (observing that the law perpetuates single parenthood by
prohibiting same-sex marriages and by limiting or prohibiting "the use of adoption [by same-sex
couples] to create a family.") Same-sex couples in stable relationships find themselves caught in
a catch-22 situation when they are not allowed to create families through adoption because the
couples are not allowed to marry. If the couples cannot expand their families by raising chil-
dren, then they supposedly have no need to many.
259. Dean, 653 A.2d at 333 (emphasis added).
260. Id. (stating that even though not all heterosexual couples procreate, marriage is a fun-
damental right for heterosexual couples because they have the ability to procreate).
261. See Marks v. Marks, 77 N.Y.S.2d 269, 270-71 (Kings County Super. Ct. 1948) (asserting
that indiviudals need not be fertile to marry as long as they are capable of having intercourse
which could result in conception).
262. See supra note 26. But see Cox v. Florida Dep't of Health and Rehabilitative Servs., 656
So. 2d 902, 903 (1995) (affirming statute prohibiting gays and lesbians from ever adopting chil-
dren); Opinion of theJustices, 129 N.H. 290, 296 (1987) (affirming the constitutionality of a bill
denying lesbians and gays the right to adopt children); Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E. 2d 102, 108
(1995) (affirming removal of a child from custody of his "out" lesbian mother).
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2. Equal Protection
Finally, the Dean court improperly granted summary judgment on
the equal protection claim. Judge Terry held that because marriage
is reserved exclusively for heterosexual couples, it is legally
impossible for a prohibition on same-sex marriage to be a denial of
equal protection.263 In other words, gender and sexual orientation
discrimination are inherent parts of the institution of marriage. 264
Judge Terry's analysis is incorrect because of its reliance on the
same "circular and flawed" reasoning of the Singer and Baker 265
courts that the Supreme Court in Loving v. irginia,266 explicitly
rejected. Long ago, the Commonwealth of Virginia and many states
found interracial marriages impermissible. They held that the
definition of marriage itself excluded interracial unions. 267
The Supreme Court struck down this definitional formulation of
263. Dean, 653 A.-2d at 362 (maintaining that it is inconsistent to conclude it is a denial of
equal protection to deny marriage to same-sex couples when it is impossible for them to marry).
264. SeeMohr, supra note 43, at 221 (arguing that gender and sexual orientation discrimina-
tion are built into marriage through a legal definition of marriage which only serves to exclude
certain couples from marriage).
265. So supra notes 51-52, 55-60 and accompanying text.
266. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
267. In Loving; the Supreme Court rejected the trial court's rationale for upholding an anti-
miscegenation statute. The trial judge stated:
Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, maiay and red, and he placed
them on separate continents. And but for the interference with his arrangement
there would be no cause for such marriages. The fact that he separated the races
shows that he did not intend for the races to mix.
Id. at 3. The Supreme Court characterized this type of reasoning as nothing more than an
"endorsement of the doctrine of [w]hite [slupremacy." Id. at 7 (citations omitted). Before the
Court decided Loving, 15 states outlawed interracial marriage: AL. CONST.,art. IV" § 102; ALA.
CODE art. 14, § 360 (1958); ARK. SrAT. ANN. § 55-104 (1947); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 101
(1953); FLA. CONST. art. 16, § 24; FLA. STAT. § 741.11 (1965); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-106 (1961);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402.020 (supp. 1966); LA. REV. STAT. § 14:79 (1950); MISS. CONSr. art.
14, sec. 263; MISS. CODE ANN. sec. 459 (1956); Mo. REV. STAT. § 451.020 (supp. 1966); N.C.
CONSr. art. XIV, § 8; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-181 (1953); OKLA. SrAT. tit 43, sec. 12 (supp. 1965);
S.C. CONST., art. 3, § 33; S.C. CODE ANN., § 20-7 (1962); TENN. CONSr., art. 11, § 14; TENN.
CODEANN. § 36-402 (1955); TEX. PEN. CODE, art. 492 (1952); W. VA. CODEANN. § 4697 (1961).
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marriage based upon its impermissible racial classifications.268 Thus,
even though the denial of access to marriage for interracial couples
applied equally to all races, the ban on such marriages was nothing
more than an attempt by Virginia legislators to preserve "white
supremacy" by keeping races separate.269  Accordingly, the
prohibitions against same-sex marriages should be struck down
because they are based on impermissible sexual classifications. 270
Yet Judge Steadman of the D.C. Superior Court had difficulty
recognizing gender discrimination as an issue in Dean. He proposed
that because both men and women are equally restricted from same-
sex marriages, it would "stretch the concept of gender discrimination
to assert that it applies to treatment of same-sex couples differently
from opposite-sex couples."271 The mere fact that both men and
women are equally prohibited from marrying does not mitigate the
discriminatory impact. When Craig Dean and Pat Gill applied for a
marriage license the Court Clerk denied the license because they are
268. Loving, 388 U.S. at 10-11. See also Trosino, supra note 53, at 116 (noting that the Su-
preme Court in Lovingphrased the question in terms of whether there was a fundamental right
to marry and whether that right could be restricted because of race, instead of whether there
was a fundamental right to interracial marriage). If the Court had asked whether there was a
fundamental right to interracial marriage, the answer would have been "no" because interracial
marriage was neither "a right 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' nor 'deeply rooted in
this nation's history.'" Trosino, supra note 53, at 115-16 (citations omitted). The Dean court did
not approach the due process issue in the same fashion. The Dean court phrased the question In
terms of whether there is a fundamental right to same-sex marriage, rather than first asking
whether there is a fundamental right to marry, and then asking whether that right could be re-
stricted by sex or sexual orientation. Dean, 653 A.2d at 331. By phrasing the issue as whether
there is a fundamental right to same-sex marriage, the court concluded that there is not a fun-
damental right to same-sex marriage because same-sex marriages are not "deeply rooted in the
Nation's history and tradition." Id. (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503
(1977)). As a consequence, the court avoided the critical issue of whether marriage may be le-
gitimately restricted by sex or sexual orientation. SeeTrosino, supra note 53, at 116 (noting that
at the trial level the Dean court followed this same approach, thus avoiding the more difcult
issue of whether marriage may be legitimately restricted by sex or sexual orientation).
269. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7, 11 (1967) (noting that cases upholding anti-
miscegenation laws endorsed white supremacy, but that those decisions rested soley on imper-
missible distinctions based on race).
270. See Sunstein, supra note 68, at 19-20 (noting that the prohibition of same-sex marriage
is sex discrimination, but that most courts thus far have cast the issue as one of discrimination
based on sexual orientation). If the prohibition of same-sex couples from marriage is discrimi-
nation based on sexual orientation, such discrimination should be subject to rational basis re-
view. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191-92 (stating there is no fundamental right to practice sodomy. If
there is no fundamental right involved, then heightened scrutiny generallywill notbe applied.).
Se also supra notes 170,176.
271. Dean, 653 A.2d at 363 n.2. The Court in Lovingrefuted a similar argument, stating "we
reject the notion that the mere 'equal application' of a statute containing racial classifications is
enough to remove the classifications from the Fourteenth Amendments proscription of all in-
vidious racial discriminations ..." Loving; 388 U.S. at 8. The Hawaii Supreme Court also rejected
the same argument. AsJudge Heen argued, the Hawaii statute treats both sexes equally so that
"neither sex is being granted a right or benefit the other does not have, and neither sex is being
denied a right or benefit that the other has." Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 71-72 (Haw. 1993)
(Heen,J., dissenting).
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both men. If Pat were a nickname for "Patricia," then "Patricia" and
Dean would have received the marriage license. Just as the ban on
interracial marriages was an attempt to prevent people of color and
whites from mixing"-to preserve white supremacy-the underlying
basis for preventing same-sex marriages is not to prevent the sexes
from mixing, but to ensure that a female-male relationship is the
only acceptable or legally recognized and therefore privileged,
union.272
Therefore, denying the marriage license to Dean and Gill is sex
272. See Sunstein, supra note 68, at 20 n.65. For more insight on this sex discrimination ar-
gument, see also Andrew Koppelman, Why Discaimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men is Sex Dis-
ciimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1994) (arguing that discrimination against gays and lesbians
is sex discrimination and that laws permitting sex discrimination cannot survive heightened
scrutiny. Additionally, Koppelman argues that laws that discriminate against lesbians and gay
men perpetuate the "hierarchy of males over females." Rd. at 199. See also Sylvia A. Law, Homo-
sexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 187 (arguing that disapproval of ho-
mosexuality stems from "reaction to the violation of gender norms, rather than simply scorn for
the violation of norms of sexual behavior" in the practices of gays and lesbians). Id. at 187.
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discrimination 273 and the State must demonstrate important
278. At first, the Supreme Court determined that sex-based classifications should be subject
to strictjudicial scrutiny because "classifications based upon sex, like classifications based upon
race, alienage, or national origin, are inherently suspect, and must therefore be subject to strict
judicial scrutiny." Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973) (striking down statutes
which assumed female spouses of male military officers were dependent but under which male
spouses of female military officers must be dependent for over one-half of their support to be
considered dependent).
Three years later, the Supreme Court toned down its language somewhat and ruled
that discrimination based on sex triggers an intermediate form of review whereby "classifications
by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives." Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (declaring that a
statute prohibiting males under age 21 from buying beer while allowing females to buy the same
beer at age 18 is discrimination against males).
It is improbable that the District of Columbia would be able to demonstrate the requi-
site "important governmental objectives." Id.Judge Steadman suggests that the state's interest in
procreation qualifies as an important governmental interest. Dean, 653 A.2d at 363-64. But see
discussion supra note 27 (noting that gay and lesbian couples can create families). In addition
to the procreation argument, other, equally faulty arguments have been advanced to demon-
strate "important governmental objectives." Craig, 429 U.S. at 197. First, opponents of same-sex
marriages have argued that marriage should be limited to heterosexuals in order to protect
children. See Andrew H. Friedman, Same-Sex Mariage and the Right to Privacy: Abandoning Scrip-
tura; Canonica4 and Natural Law Based Definitions of Marriage, 85 HoW. LJ. 173, 209 (1992)
(observing that only prejudice would keep same-sex couples from being able to to many and
raise children). C.f. Barry M. Parsons, Bottoms v. Bottoms: Erasing the Presumption Favoring a
NaturalParent Over Third Partis-What Makes this Mother Unfit?, 2 GEO. MASON IND. L. REV. 457,
472 (1994) (explaining that same courts rebuttably presume that homosexual parents are un-
fit). Opponents of same-sex marriage fear that if children interact with gays and lesbians, they
will be molested. Koppelman, supra note 273, at 280 n.314 (citations omitted) (noting that anti-
homosexual rights advocates claim lebians and gays are child molesters). Others fear homo-
sexuas will influence children's sexual identity and the children will become homosexuals. See
William E. AdamsJr., WhoseFamily Is it Anyway? The Continuing Strugglefor Lesbian and Gay Men
Seeking to Adopt Children, 30 NEv ENG. L. REV. 579, 592 (1996) (examining the claims of groups
who oppose gays and lesbians becoming parents). But seeMarc E. Elorita, Adoption By Lesbian and
Gay People The Use and Mis-use of Social Science Research, 2 DuXEJ. GENDER L. & POL'Y 207, 213
(1995) (citing research showing that "being raised by a lesbian or gay parent does not increase
the likelihood that a child will become lesbian or gay"). Research has indicated that "parental
lifestyle simply is not the single most significant factor in determining a child's psychosexual
development." DavidJ. Kieber et al., The Impact of Parental Homosexuality in Child Custody Cases: A
Review of the Literature, 14 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIA=TYL. 81,83 (1986).
Additionally, the incidence of sexual abuse in homosexual families is no greater than
the incidence of sexual abuse in heterosexual families. "The great majority of adults who per-
petuate sexual abuse are [heterosexual] males; sexual abuse of children by adult women is ex-
tremely rare.... [tihe overwhelming majority of child sexual abuse cases can be characterized as
heterosexual in nature...." Patterson, supranote 26, at 1034 (citations omitted). Second, oppo-
nents of same-sex marriages argue that allowing same-sex marriages would increase the inci-
dence of illegal homosexual activity. See Zambrowicz, supra note 210 at 947 (commenting that no
studies show the denial of same-sex marriage to lesbians and gays decreases homosexual activity)
(citing Comment, Homosexuals'Right to Many: A Constitutional Test and a Legislative Solution, 128
U. PA. L. REV. 193,211 (1979)).
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governmental interests to uphold the classification.
274
Judge Steadman also declared that the marriage statute is
constitutional because the legislature did not intend for it to reflect a
discriminatory purpose. 275 This argument is unsound because even
if the legislature did not consider or even recognize the
discriminatory effect of the statute at the time the legislature enacted
it, that does not mean that the statute lacks a discriminatory
purpose. For instance, when the Virginia legislature prohibited
interracial marriages through the enactment of its anti-
miscegenation statute, 276 the legislature did not consider the statute
to be racially discriminatory because "the idea of interracial marriage
was an oxymoron-a perceived abomination that violated divine
274. This argument is without merit in the District of Columbia because of the repeal of the
sodomy law in 1993. Dean, 653 A.2d at 334 n.30. Twenty-three states still criminalize sodomy:
Ala. Code § 13-A-65 (1995); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1411,1412 (1995); Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 5-14-
122 (1995); Fla. Stat. ch. 800.02 (1995); Ga. Code Ann. §§ 16-6-2 (1996); Idaho Code § 18-6605
(1996); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3505 (1995); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 510.100 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
1995); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:89 (West 1996); Md. Ann. Code art. 27 § 553 (1995); Mich.
Comp. Laws §§ 750.158, 750.338, 750.338b (1995); Minn. Stat. §§ 609.293 (1995); Miss. Code
Ann. § 97-29-59 (1995); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 566.090 (1995); Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-505 (1995);
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 201.190 (1995); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-177 (1995); Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 886
(1995); I.L Gen. Laws § 11-10-1 (1995); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-15-120 (law. Co-op. 1993); Tex.
Penal Code Ann. §§ 21.01(1), 21.06 (West 1996); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-403 (1995); Va. Code
Ann. § 18.2-361 (Michie 1996). Moreover, it is unjust not to allow homosexuals to marry be-
cause of their presumed sexual conduct when heterosexual couples practice sodomy as well.
Statutes prohibiting both homosexual and heterosexual sodomy often prohibit committing the
"infamous crime against nature" between consenting adults. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. sec. 13-1411
(1995); Idaho Code sec. 18-6605 (1996). Others simply prohibit sodomy or sexual acts involving
"the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another. Ga. Code Ann. sec. 16-6-2
(1996). Cf. Mont. Code Ann. sec. 45-2-101 (1995); Mont. Code Ann. sec. 45-5-505 (1995)
(prohibiting homosexual conduct but allowing heterosexual couples to practice deviate sexual
conduct); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. sec. 510.100 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1995) (prohibiting only homo-
sexual consensual sodomy). See also supranote 173.
A third argument proffered is that limiting marriage to same-sex couples will preserve the
traditional family. See Daniel A. Batterman, Evans v. Romer The Political Process, Levels of
Generality, and Perceived Identifiability in Anti-Gay Rights Initiatives, 29 New Eng. L. Rev. 915,
938 (1995) (discussing assertions made by "Colorado for Family Values" in its initiative against
gay and lesbian rights in Colorado). This argument presupposes that opposite-sex families and
same-sex families cannot co-exist simultaneously. An underlying premise of this argument is the
assumption that allowing same-sex marriage will inevitably destroy the preeminence of the tradi-
tional family. Id. Proponents of this argument ail to realize that many same-sex couples have
successfully created their own families. See Patterson, supra note 26, at 1027. Furthermore, the
recent demise of the traditional nuclear family is reflective of societal changes, not due to the
existence of same-sex families. See Gottlieb, supra note 237. It is evident that the state cannot
advance any reason thatjustifies excluding homosexuals from marriage and all of its benefits.
275. Den, 653 A.2d at 363.
276. Loving 388 U.S. at 4-6. The anti-miscegenation statute provided that "all marriages
between a white person and a colored person shall be absolutely void without any decree of di-
vorce or other legal process." Id. at 5 n.3.
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natural law. ''277
As society and race relations changed, restrictions on interracial
marriages became unacceptable. By analogy, the same is true for
same-sex couples. 278 Excluding same-sex couples from all of the
benefits of marriage is not acceptable because same-sex relationships
mirror heterosexual relationships in many respects.279
Although Judge Ferren, in his dissent, strenuously urged the
court to remand the case for trial on the equal protection claim, he
was unable to muster the sympathy of the rest of the Court of
Appeals to override the motion for summary judgment.
Nonetheless, after examining the issue thoroughly, he opined that
lesbians and gays comprise either a suspect or a quasi-suspect
class. 280 Many courts have, however, rejected the approach taken by
Judge Ferren.281 His detailed exploration of the factors282 that
determine whether a group will compromise a suspect or quasi-
suspect class dearly reveals that homosexuals are subject to invidious
discrimination.283 Additionally, lesbians and gays are also subject to
fallacious stereotypes that do not reflect their ability to raise children
in a nurturing and loving environment.284 It is disputed, however,
whether homosexuality is immutable285 and whether homosexuals
277. Dean, 653 A.2d at 360 (citation omitted). Judge Ferren alluded to other examples of
invidious discrimination without legislative intent to cause such discrimination. For example,
"railvay passenger cars were racially segregated by law, there was no perceived discriminatory
purpose; though 'separate,' they were 'equal.'" Id. (citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896)).
278. For an examination of the benefits denied to same-sex couples see Chase, supra note
252, at 359. Benefits that same-sex couples are denied include: public employee life and health
insurance, ability to give informed consent in medical emergencies, alimony, maintenance,
right to maintain wrongful death actions and to recover damages, dower rights, right of survi-
vorship, right of intestacy, right to petition for hospitalization, life insurance benefits, workers'
compensation disability payments, and tax benefits. Dean, 653 A.2d at 323 n.19 (citation omit-
ted).
279. Judge Steadman further argues that the appellants cannot make an equal protection
claim based upon a quasi-suspect status because "[mjost if not all of such statutes 'adversely'
affect all unmarried couples of whatever status, and presumably would pass the rational relation
test normally used in equal protection analysis." Id. at 364 n.7 (citations omitted). It seems as
thoughJudges Steadman and Ferren disregard the fact that even though unmarried heterosex-
ual couples are denied the same benefits as same-sex couples, heterosexual couples have the
option to marrywhereas same-sex couples do not. Id. at 342-43.
280. Id. at 309.
281. See supra notes 173, 179 (discussing generally, Dean, 653 A.2d at 340; High Tech Gays,
895 F.2d at 570-73; Ben Shalom, 881 F.2d at 464-66; Woodward, 871 F.2d at 1076, Padula, 822 F.2d
at 102-04; Watkins, 875 F.2d at 724-28; Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnat4 54 F.3d at 268).
282. Sm supra notes 177-90.
283. See supra notes 177-90.
284. See supra notes 26, 182, and 237.
285. See supra notes 185-90.
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are politically powerless.286 Perhaps the most plausible avenue to
take to attain same-sex marriage rights is by attacking such
prohibitions as sexually discriminatory.
28 7
V. RECOMMENDATONS
The continuing struggle to obtain same-sex marriage rights
warrants consideration of whether the desire to enter the institution
of marriage is worth the fight. Although it is completely irrational for
the courts to continue to condone discrimination against same-sex
couples, the immediate solution for same-sex couples seeking
marriage rights may lie in the legislature rather than in the courts. It
is apparent that even in the 1990s, courts interpret non-gendered
marriage statutes288 as narrowly as possible to avoid opening the
institution of marriage to same-sex couples.289 Additionally, asJudge
Terry demonstrated in Dean, courts are unwilling to step outside
their judicial role to create legislation that would allow same-sex
couples to marry.2 90 Consequently, state legislatures should re-
evaluate and redefine their own marriage statutes to reflect marriage
in the 1990s. Several state constitutions already contain provisions
286. See supra notes 191-92. See also Zamnbrowicz, supra note 210, at 938-39 (noting that
courts are disinclined to characterize homosexuals as politically powerless or possessing immu-
table characteristics, and as a consequence, homosexuals will not gain same-sex marriage rights
by being categorized as a suspect class). One commentator argues that not designating homo-
sexuals as a suspect class masks the true inequality that homosexuals experience, and that ho-
mosexuals are deserving of suspect class status. Se, eg., Comment, The Lesns of the Law: Same-
Sex Maniage and Baehr v. Lewin, 78 MARQ. L. REV. 121, 130-31 (1994) (noting that many
"schemes" that discriminate against homosexuals ivill not even survive a rational basis review).
But cf Sunstein, supra note 68, at 9 (arguing that it is possible that homosexuals comprise a sus-
pect class, but that argument is "unlikely to be accepted by the Court that decided Bowers").
The current Court's willingness to accept the argument that homosexuals comprise a suspect
class is unknown as it has not addressed the issue. Stephen Zainansky, Cooado's Amendment 2
and Homsexuals' Right to Equal Promtion ofthe Law, 35 B.C. L. REV. 221, 249-50 (1993) (noting
that it is unknown how the present Court will classify homosexuals, but arguing that they are a
suspect class). Ultimately, Sunstein suggests that discrimination against homosexuals should
initially receive rational basis review. In time, "laws against homosexual orientation and behav-
ior will soon come to be seen as products of unfounded prejudice and hostility, and private
prejudice and hostility will recede." Sunstein, supra note 68 at 1.
287. Seesupra notes 242-45. The author is not discounting other legal arguments such as due
process or discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation as effective legal strategies. Previous
courts addressing same-sex marriage claims have, however, refused to adopt such arguments.
The only court in the United States that has possibly recognized same-sex marriage rights is the
court in Baehr. Se generally supra Part I.D. Although the court was construing the Hawaii Con-
stitution which explicitly prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex, it is not implausible that
the United States Constitution or another state constitution could be interpreted to prohibit
such discrimination on the same grounds. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 67.
288. SeesupraPartllA.
289. Dean, 653 A.2d at 310 (interpreting the District of Columbia marriage statute narrowly).
290. id. at 361-62 (suggesting that the legislature, not the court, should legalize same-sex
marriage).
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that are open to same-sex marriage challenges.29'
Additionally, states that have enacted statutes to eliminate sexual
orientation and sex discrimination 292 should interpret those statutes
broadly to fulfill the legislatures' purpose. Courts that, like the Dean
court, are hesitant to legislate from the bench should not shy away
from permitting same-sex marriage claims under legislation that
mandates the elimination of discrimination based on sex and sexual
orientation.
Even though it appears that the immediate solution for same-sex
couples seeking marriage rights is to push for legislation, the
controversy over same-sex marriages will ultimately have to be
resolved by the Supreme Court. Discrimination against homosexuals
in all aspects of life has divided the courts and will continue to divide
the courts for years to come.293 Because the Bowers Court decided
the issue of consensual homosexual sodomy on due process
grounds and not equal protection grounds, many issues affecting
homosexuals remain unanswered, including whether homosexuals
291. These state provisions include: CAL. CONsT. art. 1, § 8 ("A person may not be disquali-
fied from entering or pursuing a business, profession, vocation, or employment because of sex
... "); COLO. CONsr. art. II, § 29 ("Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or
abridged by the State of Colorado ... on account of sex"); CONN. CONST. art. I, § 20 ("No per-
son shall be denied the equal protection of the law nor be subjected to ... discrimination ... be-
cause of... sex..."); HAW. CoNsr. art. 1, § 6 (recognizing a right of privacy which "shall not be
infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest"); ILL. CONST. art. I, § § 17, 18
(prohibiting sex discrimination in employment and in property sale or rental, and sex discriml-
nation generally); LA. CONST. art. I, §§ 3 ("No law shall arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably
discriminate against a person because of ... sex"); LA. CONST. art. I, §§ 12 ("In access to public
areas, accommodations, and facilities, every person shall be free from ... discrimination based
on ... sex ... "); MASS. CONST. art. VI ("Equality under the law shall not be deemed abridged be-
cause of sex ... "); MONT. CONSr. art. II, § 4 ("[Ihe State ... shall [not] discriminate against any
person in the exercise of his [sic] civil or political rights on account of... sex..."); N.H. CONST.
art. I, § 2 ("Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by this State on ac-
count of ... sex ... "); N.M. CONST. art. H, § 18 ("Equality under the law shall not be denied on
account of the sex of any person."); TEL. CONST. art. I, § 3a ("Equality of rights under law shall
not be denied or abridged because of sex ..."); VA. CONsT. art. I, § 11 ("[T]he right to be free
from any governmental discrimination upon the basis of... sex ... shall not be abridged ... ");
WYo. CONST. art. I, § 3 ("[T]he laws of this State affecting the political rights and privileges of
its citizens shall be without distinction of... sex...").
292. S supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
293. SeeTnTeAppeal in Pima CountyJuvenile Action, 727 P.2d 830, 835 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986)
(denying a homosexual man the right to adopt because he might engage in "homosexual activ-
ity"); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., _ F.3d .. , 1996 WL 223627,*2 (5th Cir. 1996)
(concluding that same-sex sexual harrassment is not protected under Title VII); Woodward v.
United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076-77 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (affirming the Department of Navy's
dismissal of a gay male employee). But see Romer v. Evans, _ U.S. _ 116 S.Ct. 1620 (1996)
(overturning a statute which prohibited the State of Colorado or its entities from protecting
homosexuals from discrimination).
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can be restricted from military service,294 employment2 95 or
marriage.
296
If same-sex couples elect to continue to fight for same-sex
marriage rights in the courts, same-sex litigants should consider
advancing equal protection arguments based on gender
discrimination rather than sexual orientation discrimination. First,
it is debatable whether homosexuality is immutable and whether
homosexuals are politically powerless.2 97  Second, the sexual
orientation discrimination argument has already been rejected by a
number of federal courts. 298 Consequently, same-sex litigants may
have more success in court by arguing that the prohibition of same-
sex marriage is gender discrimination.
299
It is apparent that state legislatures and the courts must re-
evaluate the institution of marriage. Simarily, same-sex couples
should consider whether it is worthwhile to exert all their time and
energy trying to gain marriage rights when many heterosexual
relationships fail after marriage. Several gay rights advocates
294. Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d at 464-66 (reaffirming Army's refusal to re-enlist an out lesbian);
Woodw-ard v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (upholding dismissal of a ho-
mosexual male from the Department of Navy). But se Matlovich v. Secretary of the Air Force,
591 F.2d 852, 857 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (requiring the Air Force to give a reasoned explanation for
discharging a serviceman who informed his superiors he is a homosexual, when the person's
ability to serve is not diminished).
295. See Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 104 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (permitting the continued ex-
clusion of homosexual applicants for FBI employment). But cf Pruittv. Cheney, 963 F.2d 1160,
1166 n.5 (9th Cir. 1992) (arguing that active rational basis review should be used to examine
claims of dismissal from employment based solely on employee's homosexuality).
296. Dean, 653 A.2d at 307 (refusing same-sex marriage claim). But se Baehr v. Lewin, 852
P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993) (holding that sex is a suspect category deserving strict scrutiny under
the awaii Constitution and requiring compelling state interest to deny a marriage license to
same sex couples).
297. Se supra notes 244-45 (discussing whether lesbians and gays are politically powerless
and whether homosexuality is an immutable trait). Dr. Simon LeVay at the Salk Institute in La
Jolla, California is a leading proponent of the "gay gene" theory. He claims he found a biologi-
cal difference between the hypothallamus of homosexual men as opposed to the hypothallamus
of heterosexual men. Michael Bailey Richard Pillard, Are Some Peopk Born Gay?, N.Y. THM,
Dec. 17,1991, atA21.
298. Se, eg., Dean, 653 A2d at 340; High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 570-73; Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d
at 464-66; Woodward, 871 F.2d at 1076; Padula, 822 F.2d at 102-04.
299. See Koppelman, supra note 272, at 199 (arguing that discrimination against gays and
lesbians is gender discrimination, and contending that this argument may eventually end dis-
crimination against lesbians and gays because itis more likely to be accepted).
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support this proposition.3 0
0
Furthermore, same-sex couples form successful and stable
relationships without marriage.2 0l If same-sex couples can retain the
same benefits of marriage through domestic partnership legislation,
perhaps same-sex couples should seriously consider whether gay
rights are advanced or hindered by entering the institution of
marriage.
VI. CONCLUSION
Lesbians and gays are victims of pernicious, heterosexist
discrimination which relegates these individuals to second-class
citizenship. Consequently, the status of same-sex marriage rights
remains at a crossroad. The ruling in Dean is a key decision in the
movement to obtain same-sex marriage rights because it
demonstrates that even after the decision in Bowers, a low blow to
the gay and lesbian rights movement, same-sex couples may not
obtain marriage rights even outside the privacy doctrine. The
decision in Baehr v. Lewin as well as Judge Ferren's thoughtful
dissent, signals judicial reconsideration of the inequity of continuing
300. Professor Nancy Polikoff argues, "I believe that the desire to marry in the lesbian and
gay community is an attempt to mimic the worst of mainstream society, an effort to fit into an
inherently problematic institution that betrays the promise of both lesbian and gay liberation
and radical feminism." Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For Why Legalizing Gay and
Lesbian Marriage Wil Not "Dinnantle The Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage', 79 VA. L. REV.
1535, 1536 (1993). See also Steven K Homer, Against Marriage 29 HARV. C.tR-C.L. L REV. 505,
506 (1994) (arguing that marriage may not be the panacea that same-sex couples are searching
for because "[i] t may very well create whole new levels of legal inequality ... the benefits associ-
ated with marriage are likely to come in a piecemeal fashion because ... marriage does not cre-
ate social approval but merely stands in for it."
201. SeeAlma G. Lopez, Homosexual Marrage, the ChangingAmerican Family, and the Hteosex
ualRight toPrivacy, 24 SErONHALLL. REV. 347, 388 n.204 (1993) (noting that homosexual rela-
tionships are just as likely to be permanent and successful as heterosexual relationships when
the couples have the ability to communicate and compromise); Eskridge, supra note 24, at 1483
(noting that there are more longterm same-sex couples than ever before).
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to treat same-sex couples as outcasts of society.3 02 The legalization
of same-sex marriage is not a panacea for all of the inequalities that
gays and lesbians encounter on a daily basis. However, lifting the
ban on same-sex marriages will be one small step in the direction of
attaining true equal rights.3 0 3  Many same-sex couples and
heterosexual couples experience love and express love in many of
the same ways. 04 There is simply no justification for society or the
courts to continue to deprive same-sex couples of the fiffillment that
marriage can bring to a relationship.
Even with the removal of legal restrictions on interracial
marriages in 1967, it still took time for society to edge closer to
accepting interracial marriages.305  Homosexuals have been
struggling for marriage rights since the 1970s.306 Hopefuflly, the
302. Likewise, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Romer v. Evans signifies the Court's
intolerance of discrimintory measures targeting gays and lesbians based purely on "animosity" of
such individuals. Romer v. Evans, _ U.S. .._,116 S. Ct 1620, No. 94-1039, LEXIS 3245, at* 20
(1996). In Romer, the Supreme Court rejected Colorado's Amendment 2, which repealed ordi-
nances that were designed to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Id. at
*6. The Court ruled that Amendment 2 violated the gurantee of equal protection under the
constitution. Id. at *26. While the Romer decision is a significant victory for homosexuals, it is
difficult to predict the impact of the Court's analysis on other gay-rights issues such as same-sex
marriages. The Romer ruling essentially states that societal 'prejudice" against homosexuals can
never be the basis of passing discriminatory laws against homosexuals. Terry Tang, Supreme Court
Stands UpforBasic Human Digniy, THE SEATrLE TIMES, May 24, 1996, at B4. Logically, any ban
on same-sex marriages that is based upon societal prejudice would be unconstitutional. Vicki
Haddock, Gays Cheer Court Victory,San Francisco Rxamine, May 21, 1996. This issue may be more
"complicated" because the state may purpot reasons to ban same-sex marriages that are unre-
lated to societal prejudice against homosexuals. Terry Tang, Supreme Court Stands Up for Basic
HumanDignty, THE SFATII TmS, May 24,1996, atB4.
303. See Eskridge, supra note 24, at 1486 (arguing that same-sex marriages would protect gay
and lesbian couples from hostile heterosexuals by giving them the same rights as heterosexual
couples). But see Homer, supra note 256, at 506 (arguing that same-sex marriage rights will not
create equity for homosexuals); Polikoff, supra note 300, at 1549 (asserting that same-sex mar-
riage rights would compromise the struggle to separate economic and health care benefits from
marriage). Paula Ettlebrick, a gay and lesbian rights advocate, argues that "the law should rec-
ognize many different forms of family." Rob Polner, Domestic Partners; To Have & Hold: Gay Cau-
pies Get More Legal Perks, NEWSDAY, June 23, 1994, at A15. Ettlebrick also cautions against
"put[ting] all our eggs in the marriage basket." David W. Dunlap, Some Gay RightsAdvocates Ques-
tion Drive to Defend Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIamsJune 7,1996 atA12.
304. Zambrowicz, supra note 210, at 947 n.266 (citing DAVID KNOX, CHoicEs IN RELA-
TIONSHIPS: AN INTRODUCTION TO MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY, 78 (1985)).
305. Society still may not accept interracial couples. A 1991 Gallup Poll of white Americans
found that 45% disapprove of interrracial marriage, and 44% approve of it. A 1990 General
Social Survey found that 65% of the respondents, who were predominately white, object to a
close relative being involved in an interracial marriage. Trosino, supra note 53, at 93 n.2. In
1994, a county clerk in Tennessee refused to perform a marriage ceremony for an interracial
couple. The couple threatened a law suit and the county settled out of court for $5,000. Int-ra-
cial Couple Settles Over Rebuff on Marriage.Rites, TBE COmMERCIAL AP.PEAL, May 7, 1994, at 15A. But
see Keane, supra note 10 at 515 (stating that interracial marriages are "formerly controversial
union").
306. See Eskridge, supra note 24, at 1420-21 (noting that gays and lesbians began actively
fightingfor recognition of same-sex marriages after the Stonewall Riots in 1969).
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courts and society will someday embrace homosexual relationships
and will lift the restriction on same-sex marriages. The Romer
decision does not provide a clear answer as to whether same-sex
marriage bans are unconstitutional, but the court's language will
undoubtedly ignite a debate over the constitutionality of such bans.
